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ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN SECURITIES FRAUD
DISPUTES
Robert A. Lusardi *

1.

INTRODUCTION

There is always a risk of conflict between an investor and his
stockbroker. This conflict is particularly real when the investor
has suffered a large loss, which he frequently believes to be the
result of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the broker.
Upon hearing the tale of the client-investor, an attorney may rec
ognize a variety of potential claims against the broker and his
firm. These claims may include violations of section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933;1 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934;2 the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; A.B., Colgate Univer
sity, 1968; J.D., Boston College, 1971.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12(2) provides:
Any person who
(2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if
he no longer owns the security.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil
ity of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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("RICO");3 and state law blue sky, fraud and breach of contract
claims.· On first glance the attorney may conclude that these
claims should be joined in a single action to be filed in federal
court. The claims under federal statutes have a clear jurisdic
tional base;1i the state law claims may be swept into federal court
under diversity jurisdiction,S or if that is unavailable, the state
law claims may be brought under pendent jurisdiction. 7 Upon fur
ther examination, however, the attorney may discover that when
the client-investor opened his account with the broker, he entered
into a customer's agreement which provided that in the event of
any controversy arising out of the broker-investor relationship,
the matter was to be submitted to arbitration. 8
Pursuant to this provision the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] adopted Rule Q
lOb-5 which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1985). Under these provisions, courts have implied private rights of
action ("Rule 10b-5 claims"). E.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380
(1983); Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971). A brief history of the early development of the concept of implied rights is
set out in L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1057-58 (1983).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Section 1962(c) provides:
(c) it shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter
prise's affairs through 8 pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
Any person injured by a violation of this section may sue the person causing the injury in
federal court for treble damages and attorney's fees. [d. § 1964(c).
4. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 101.
5. Under the Securities Act of 1933, jurisdiction is proper in state or federal court, and
if the action is brought in state court it is not removable. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there is exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
district courts. [d. § 78aa.
Under RICO there is concurrent jurisdiction in the federal district court. 18 U.S.C. §
1964 (1982).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
7. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
8. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982), does not define the
term "arbitration," but one district court defined it as follows:
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The existence of such a pre-dispute arbitration clause,9 not
withstanding its intent to avoid litigation, has led to extensive lit
igation to resolve whether the client-investor can be required to
arbitrate claims that he may have against the broker.lo The his
torical reluctance on the part of courts to enforce arbitration
agreements l l was changed by Congress when it adopted the FedArbitration is a creature of contract, a device of the parties rather than the
judicial process. If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by
a third party, they have agreed to arbitration. The arbitrator's decision need not
be binding in the same sense that a judicial decision needs to be to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of a justiciable case or controversy.
AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
9. The Securities Industry Association has adopted an arbitration clause which reads:
It is understood that the following agreement to arbitrate does not constitute
a waiver of the right to seek a judicial forum where such a waiver would be void
under the federal securities law.
The undersigned agrees, and by carrying an account for the undersigned you
agree, that except as inconsistent with the foregoing sentence, all controversies
which may arise between us concerning any transaction or the construction, per
formance or breach of this or any other agreement between us, whether entered
into prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof, shall be determined by
arbitration.
[July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1860 (Oct. 18, 1985).
Another example of a customer's arbitration agreement is set out in 5 A. SOMMER. SE
CURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES-TRANSACTIONS-LITIGATION ch. 118, app. A (1988) [hereinafter
SOMMER].
It should be noted that not all customers sign these agreements. Some brokerage houses
only require them for margin or option accounts and not for cash customers. SOMMER,
supra, at § 118.02[4]. The SEC staff has reported to the Commission that a survey it had
conducted of industry practices indicated that approximately 39 percent of cash accounts
are covered by arbitration clauses, but that 99.5-99.6 percent of margin and option ac
counts are covered by such clauses. [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1053
(July 8, 1988). Concern that brokerage firms may require the signing of an arbitration
agreement as a condition of doing business has led to a bill being introduced in Congress
which, among other things, would ban mandatory arbitration agreements. Id. at 838, 850,
1053-54 (referring to H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988». The SEC has decided to
oppose any legislation on this issue until it further studies the issue. Id. at 1053.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has adopted regulations effective January 1, 1989,
that will ban mandatory arbitration between brokers and investors; other states are con
sidering similar bans. [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1436 (Sept. 23,
1988). The Massachusetts regulations were recently struck down by a federal district
court. Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1988, at B8, col. 3.
10. E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1985). Of course, while
my scenario suggests dealings between brokers and their clients, the same issues could
arise in any setting in which there is a contract with a pre-dispute arbitration clause and a
legal dispute arising out of the contract. See, e.g., State Establishment for Agric. Product
Trading v. Wesermunde, 770 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1985) (commercial shipping arbitration).
11. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220 n.6 (citing the House Report on the Federal Arbitration Act,
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1924».
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eral Arbitration Actlll ("Arbitration Act") in which it indicated a
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. IS In some instances,
however, courts have refused to enforce these agreements as to
statutorily based causes of action when it is determined that Con
gress has indicated, implicitly or explicitly, that the plaintiff is
entitled to a judicial determination of his or her rights. The res
olution of the question of the arbitrability of a claim has resulted
in a balancing of competing interests to determine when an arbi
tration agreement should be enforced. 16
In addressing the issue of the enforcement of arbitration agree
ments primary questions remain unanswered: first, which securi~
ties claims should be subject to pre-dispute arbitration agree
ments; and second, whether there exists a continuing justification
for exempting any of these claims from arbitration. The United
States Supreme Court has begun to address these questions in
recent years, and it recently clarified its position in Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon. I6
Initially, this article seeks to explain the context in which these
disputes arise, and to suggest the reasons why plaintiffs strongly
oppose the arbitration of claims in this area. It then reviews the
Arbitration Act, and the rationale for establishing exceptions to
the general policy of enforcing arbitration. Next, it considers the
appropriateness of the analysis used in deciding whether to send
cases to arbitration, and the problems which have arisen as a re
sult of those decisions. Finally, it recommends changes in the ar
bitration process to resolve these problems and to better allow for
the arbitration of securities disputes.

1.

12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982) (formerly the United States Arbitration Act).
13. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Congo 1st Sess. (1924). ("The purpose of this bill is to make
valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration. . . . Arbitration agreements are purely
matters of contract and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live
up to his agreement .... An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs.").
14. E.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-38 (recognizing that Congress "has enacted the Securi
ties Act to protect the rights of investors and has forbidden a waiver of any of those
rights" and concluding that "the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is
better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising
under the [Securities) Act"); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-38 (2d Cir.), cert. de
nied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; Perot, 548 F.2d at 438.

16. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
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OPPOSITION TO ARBITRATION

In order to understand the issues raised concerning the arbi
trability of securities disputes, it is appropriate to first consider
the reasons for conflict between the parties as to whether a claim
should be sent to arbitration. On its face it would seem that arbi
tration is a method of dispute resolution that benefits both par
ties, since it is a fast and relatively inexpensive means to resolve
claims.17 Plaintiffs, however, frequently oppose arbitration; in
plaintiffs' view, the speed and low cost of arbitration is out
weighed by the existence of several factors.
First, arbitration is viewed as being incapable of handling com
plex legal disputes because of the informal nature of the process,
and because arbitrators are not as qualified as judges to handle
the critical decisions required in a securities case. IS Second, the
absence of a significant discovery system in arbitration places a
plaintiff at a disadvantage in attempting to ferret out the detailed
information necessary to establish a claim. IS Third, the informal
ity of the arbitration process makes it difficult for the courts to
supervise the propriety of the decision-making process; there is
no requirement that a record be kept of the proceedings, or that
the arbitrator's decision state the reasons for the decision. 20
Fourth, since the arbitration process is regulated by the securities
industry, plaintiffs question the propriety of persons involved
with the securities industry deciding cases which effectively oper
ate to regulate that industry.21 Finally, the arbitration of claims
may limit the plaintiffs right to obtain punitive damages under
state law. 22 At this stage, it is sufficient to accept these objections
17. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 80 (1985).
18. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
19. Katsoris, Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 287
n.52 (1984) ("Generally, pre-trial discovery procedures, such as bills of particulars, inter
rogatories, depositions, and notices to produce documents for inspection . . . 'focus the
dispute by bringing to light the pertinent differences before trial.'" (citing Goldstein, Is
sue of Pretrial Discovery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at D4, col. 1)).
20. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
21. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 309-11. See also Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen
ner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1976); Krause,
Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements for
Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 720 (1980).
22. [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1917 (Dec. 7, 1984) (reporting a
colloquy between Justice Brennan and the attorney for the defendant during the oral ar
gument in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), in which it was as
serted that plaintiffs seek to avoid arbitration since arbitrators cannot award punitive
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to arbitration. With these objections in mind, the development of
the law concerning arbitration of securities disputes, and the re
cent judicial reconsideration of these principles can be examined.
III.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

Congress adopted the Arbitration Act in 1925 with the specific
purpose of overriding the reluctance of courts to enforce arbitra
tion agreements. 2S Congress recognized that courts had histori
cally viewed the arbitration process with hostility and suspicion.
In an effort to reduce the delay and expense parties faced in the
litigation process, Congress required the enforcement of arbitra
tion agreements to the same extent as other contracts in matters
that related to interstate commerce and admiralty.24 Courts have
enforced the requirements of the Arbitration Act as a matter of
substantive law in both federal2l! and state courts. 26 While strong
arguments have been made that the statute was only intended as
a procedural device to require federal courts to enforce these
agreements,27 judicial interpretations of the statute have gone far
damages under New York law). While New York law, which often controls state law claims
in these cases, prohibits an arbitrator from granting punitive damages, Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976), it has been argued
that, under the Arbitration Act and recent Supreme Court decisions, a federal court en
forcing an arbitration award should not apply the New York rule. Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy; The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1360-63
(1985); see Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D.S.D. 1987)
(upholding an arbitration award of punitive damages and saying that Garrity was inappli
cable because federal law applied).
The importance of punitive damages is illustrated by a recent case in Sioux Falls, South
Dakota, in which a jury entered an award against a broker of $20,000 in compensatory
damages and $2.25 million in punitive damages. Wall St. J., May 5, 1987, at 20, col. 2.
23. The House report stated the purpose of the Arbitration Act as follows:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some
centuries ago, because of the jealousy.of the English courts for their own juris
_ diction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground
that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy sur
vived for so Ion [sic] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the
English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
24. Id. at 1. The adoption of this statute ultimately led to a series of problems relating
to Congress's power to legislate in this area. An interesting analysis of these problems is
set out in Hirshman, supra note 22.
25. E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
26. E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
27. Id. at 25-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2528 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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beyond this, leading to the federalization of the law of
arbitration. 28
Given the strong federal policy established under the Arbitra
tion Act, the issue arose as to whether there were any situations
in which competing federal interests would restrict the enforce
ment of arbitration agreements. This issue of balancing compet
ing federal interests' presented itself clearly in the case of Wilko v.
Swan. 29
A.

The Wilko Decision

In Wilko, the Supreme Court was faced with a claim pursuant
to section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act").3o
A brokerage firm customer filed suit, alleging that he had lost
money in a stock transaction due to misrepresentations by the
firm.31 The defendants moved for a stay pending arbitration in
accordance with the parties' pre-dispute agreement. 32 The district
court denied the application of the stay as a deprivation of the
plaintiffs right to a judicial remedy under the Securities Act. 33
The court of appeals reversed and the stay was granted. 34
The Supreme Court was faced with the problem of balancing
the Arbitration Act's policy of enforcing arbitration agreements
against the grant of a judicial remedy under the Securities Act. It
was claimed that Congress specifically sought to protect this judi
cial remedy by the inclusion of a provision in section 14 of the
Securities Act which states: "Any condition, stipulation, or provi
sion binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli
arice with any provision of this subchapter or the rules and regu
28. Hirshman, supra note 22, at 1306-08. Professor Hirshman explains that "the Su
preme Court established the Arbitration Act as the governing law in state courts and indi
cated that issues of arbitrability would be decided as a matter of federal law in accordance
with the federal policy favoring arbitration." [d. at 1307.
29. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). See supra note 1.
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. The plaintiff claimed that his brokerage firm induced
him to purchase shares in a corporation on speculation that it would be bought out at a
price above the market price. The plaintiff alleged that he was not told that an insider of
the corporation was selling shares of the corporation, and further alleged that he had pur
chased some or all of the insider's shares. When the merger did not occur the plaintiff sold
his shares at a loss.
32. The arbitration clause was included in the margin agreement that had been exe
cuted by the parties. [d.
33. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
34. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
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lations of the Commission shall be void."sli The plaintiff asserted
that a pre-dispute agreement that provides for the arbitration of
any disputes constitutes a "waiver" of the statutorily granted
right to assert a restitution-like claim under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act in a federal court.S8 The plaintiff argued that the
arbitration provision should therefore be voided, and the case
should continue in federal court, which would' provide the plain
tiff greater protection than would an informal arbitration
proceeding. 87
The Supreme Court concluded that "the right to select a judi
cial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under
section 14 of the Securities Act."88 The Court reasoned that pur
chasers of securities were at a substantial informational disadvan
tage in dealing with issuers and dealers in securities transactions,
and that Congress therefore sought to give them some protection
by providing them with a wider choice of forums to protect their
interests. 89 In addition, the Court viewed arbitration as an inap
propriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes involving com
plex "legal" questions that an arbitrator would be ill-prepared to
decide. 40 This was of special concern to the Court because there
was very limited judicial review of the arbitrator's decision,41 and
no requirement of a written record or decision. 42 The Court
viewed this limited judicial review as inconsistent with the inten
tion of Congress, as expressed in the Securities Act, to provide
judicial supervision of the remedy provided to plaintiffs in this
area. 48 In light of these concerns, the Court balanced what it per
ceived to be the conflicting policies of arbitration and investor
protection, and concluded that arbitration agreements are invalid
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432-33.
37. [d.
38. [d. at 435 ("The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue. He thus
surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when he is
less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his
adversary.").

39. [d.
40. [d. at 435-37.
41. [d. at 436-37 (stating that if the submission to the arbitrator was "unrestricted" the
arbitrators' interpretation of the law would not be subject to judicial review under the
Arbitration Act).

42. [d.
43. [d.
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as a method to resolve issues arising under the Securities Act. 44
In coming to its conclusion, the majority showed a substantial
concern for the investor protections provided by Congress under
the Securities Act, as well as an uneasiness about the use of arbi
tration in contexts other than the standard commercial transac
tions which involve the "quality of a commodity or the amount of
money due under a contract."u This uneasiness was compounded
by the Court's determination to narrowly view the role of the ju
diciary in the submission to arbitration and in the review of the
arbitrator's decision under the Arbitration Act. The Court con
cluded that unless the parties' arbitration agreement provides
otherwise, the Arbitration Act prohibits all judicial review of legal
interpretations by the arbitrator, absent a "manifest disregard" of
the law. 46 This restrictive view of judicial review, while not neces-'
sary to its holding,·n was critical to its decision. The Court re
garded judicial supervision as central to Congress's design in the
adoption of the Securities Act. The limited nature of judicial su
pervision, as perceived by the Court in the context of arbitration
44. [d. at 438 ("Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may
provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention of Con
gress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities) Act.").
45. [d. at 435 (footnote omitted).
46. [d. at 436-37. Specifically, section 10 of the Arbitration Act provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration
. (a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei
ther of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence perti
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
47. Justice Jackson concurred in the majority opinion on the question of whether the
Securities Act prohibited a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate, but he thought it unneces
sary to decide whether the Arbitration Act would prevent judicial review of an arbitrator's
interpretation of the law. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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agreements, tipped the balance in favor of non-waiveability.48
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter focused on the question of
judicial supervision and review of the arbitrator's decision. 49 He
reasoned that an arbitrator is capable of and required to decide
cases under section 12(2), and that it is proper for courts to re
view those decisions to insure compliance with the law. lio Justice
Frankfurter argued that, in order to encourage the speedy and
economical resolution of disputes which Congress had intended
under the Arbitration Act, the Court should imply the power to
require sufficient formality in the proceedings so that a court
could review the arbitration decision to insure compliance with
the law in the substantive decision. iiI Based on this analysis, he
saw no reason why the arbitration agreement should not be en
forced, as long as it was freely agreed to by the parties. li2
48. [d. at 437.
49. [d. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. [d.
51. [d. Justice Frankfurter stated:

Arbitrators may not disregard the law. Specifically they are, as Chief Judge
Swan pointed out, "bound to decide in accordance with the provisions of section
12(2)." On this we are all agreed. It is suggested, however, that there is no effec
tive way of assuring obedience by the arbitrators to the governing law. But since
their failure to observe this law "would. . . constitute grounds for vacating the
award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," ... appropriate
means for judicial scrutiny must be implied in the form of some record or opin
ion, however informal, whereby such compliance will appear, or want of it will
upset the award.
[d. at 440. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
52. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The question of whether the
contract was freely entered into or whether there was fraud involved in entering into the
contract would go to arbitration, unless the parties had otherwise agreed. Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967). The question of whether
the clause providing for arbitration was freely given or obtained by fraud, would be re
solved by the court. [d.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d
391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981). If the claim of fraud relates both to the arbitration agreement and
the entire agreement, it has been argued by at least one district court that the court must
resolve the issue of fraud in entering the arbitration agreement. Rush v. Oppenheimer &
Co., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1045, 1048-53 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). Contra Schacht v. Beacon Ins. Co.,
742 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1984) (taking the position that a claim of fraud in the in
ducement should be decided by a court only when it goes solely to the arbitration clause,
and not to the entire contract).
The basis for this distinction is section 4 of the Arbitration Act which provides that if a
party refuses to arbitrate under an agreement, the other party may sue in the federal
district court to compel arbitration. If the court is "satisfied that the making of the agree
ment for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Under the statute, the agreement to arbitrate is to be
enforced "save on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con
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It is clear that Wilko was premised only in part on the special
nature of the rights provided to investors under the Securities
Act. Going beyond the special'nature of those rights, the majority
was strongly influenced by the perceived inability of the arbitra
tion system to provide a consistently effective decision-making
process for the resolution of these claims. The Court was con
cerned that once the matter was turned over to arbitration there
was no effective means of judicial control to insure that the arbi
trator was properly performing his job in resolving disputes.
Taking heed of the Wilko Court's concern about the arbitration
system, lower federal courts determined that they would not en
force pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a number of situa
tions. 53 In these cases, the courts focused less on the special ele
ments of the claim created by Congress and the broad·
jurisdictional choices provided to plaintiffs, and instead looked at
whether the arbitration clause would prevent the plaintiff from
exercising an important right to a federal forum. 54 In no area of
law was this more fully realized than in claims implied under
Rule 10b-5.
B. Rule lOb-5 Claims

For the next twenty-two years courts took a broad view of
Wilko, and uniformly decided not to send Rule 10b-5 claims to
arbitration. 55 The primary focus of those opinions was the exis
tract." 9 u.s.C. § 2 (1982). More than an allegation of impropriety is necessary to raise an
issue which a court will review since there is nothing inherently wrong with standardized
contracts. Boyd v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 611 F. Supp. 218, 220-21 (S.D.
Fla. 1985). Moreover, it is clear that any questions concerning the scope of arbitration are
to be resolved in favor of arbitrability. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Austin Mun. Sec. v. Nafl Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757
F.2d 676, 696 (5th Cir. 1985).
53. E.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (state claims
which are intertwined with non-arbitrable federal claims); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432,
436-38 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977) (Rule 10b-5 claim); American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825-28 (2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claim);
S.A. Mineracao de Trindade Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 574-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (RICO).
54. Thus, in the antitrust area, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was con
cerned about the public interest sought to be protected by the Sherman Act, and that
Congress must have ,wanted those "private attorney-general" actions to be decided by a
federal court. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968).
55. The uniform treatment of Rule lOb-5 claims is best shown by the number of cases
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213
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tence of section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act")G6 which, in a fashion similar to the language of
section 14 of the Securities Act,G7 prohibits the enforcement of
any provision which purports to waive compliance with the Act.
Largely based on this provision, courts concluded that the Wilko
analysis should be applied to these cases. G6 No strong attempt was
made to evaluate the differences between the two categories of
cases;1!9 instead, the courts focused on the federal interest in pro
(1985), in which the defendants did not request arbitration of Rule 10b-5 claims when
requesting arbitration of state law claims. In Byrd. itself, the Supreme Court declined to
address the question of whether Wilko precluded arbitration agreements with regard to
these federal claims because the defendant had failed to seek to compel arbitration of the
Rule 10b-5 claim in the district court. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.1; Dimenstien v. White
man, 759 F.2d 1514, 1516 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985). See supra note 2.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982) ("Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder,
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.").
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). See supra text accompanying note 35.
58. E.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979). The court
stated:
As to the federal claims . . . Wilko ... precludes compelling Mansbach to
submit the matter to arbitration. The arbitration agreement is overridden by the
anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws. While Wilko arose under
the Securities Act of 1933, its holding and rationale are equally applicable to
cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
[d. at 1030; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th
Cir. 1979); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1977).
59. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
We need not review here the fundamental and important differences between
litigation in a court and arbitration. It is enough to say that the Supreme Court
found prospective waivers of the right to judicial trial and review to be inconsis
tent with Congress' overriding concern for the protection of investors . . . . As
Merrill Lynch points out, a "colorable argument" can be made that Wilko v.
Swan should not apply to arbitration of judicially implied causes of action under
the 1934 Act. We are not, however, persuaded that either the differences be
tween the rights granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts or any consideration of pol
icy warrant such a distinction.
Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536 (footnotes omitted). It is interesting to note that while the courts
were always very careful to avoid what was described as the "shrill cry against arbitra
tion," Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910
(1977), the bottom line of the decisions was that the courts viewed arbitration with a lin
gering suspicion that it was not capable of handling complex legal questions, and that it
would therefore be inappropriate to apply the Arbitration Act as a matter of policy.
In Ayres, the court noted that Congress had at least suggested support for the view that
Wilko applied to Rule 10b-5 claims. Ayres, 538 F.2d at 537. This view was based on a
reference to the question in the legislative history to Securities Act Amendments of 1975.
H.R. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 321, 342. That legislative history is susceptible to a variety of interpretations, see
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tecting investors, which is present in all of the securities laws, and
concluded that those interests would best be protected by provid
ing a judicial forum.
In opposition to this position, it was suggested that a "colorable
argument" could be made that the differences between claims
under section 12(2) and Rule lOb-5 were significant enough to
justify different results on the issue of arbitration. 60 This reason
ing provided the basis for the one remaining argument that Rule
10b-5 claims were arbitrable. 61 Without evaluating the validity of
this argument at this point,62 there are a number of distinctions
between section 12(2) claims and Rule lOb-5 claims which could
provide a basis for different treatment. First, Rule 10b-5 actions
have not been created by Congress as a provision of the Exchange
Act, but have been implied by courts from the general prohibition
language of the statute. 63 Since Congress did not create the cause
of action, it can be argued that it never exempted this action from
its general policy in favor of arbitration under the Arbritation
Act. 64 Second, because neither the Exchange Act nor the rules
thereunder create a right of action by their terms, it can be ar
gued that a court cannot rely on the language of section 29, which
voids agreements that waive compliance with the Exchange Act,
or rules thereunder.611 Third, because Rule lOb-5 actions are more
infra text accompanying notes 111-13, and was specifically addressed by the Supreme
Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). See infra
note 155.
60. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
61. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-47 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Justice Blackmun suggested in McMahon that the majority's failure to address this
"colorable argument" relegated it "to its proper place in the graveyard of ideas." [d. at
2347 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra text accompa
nying notes 120-43 for an analysis of the distinctions between the claims.
63. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14. This dicta in Scherk was not followed by the
lower courts, which felt bound by the strong federal policies protecting investors. Scherk
was distinguished on the ground that the case was decided on the principles of interna
tional comity. E.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d
831, 833-35 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v.' Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. See, e.g., Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (1985) (White, J., concurring). Contra Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1978), where
the court stated: "Thus through § 29(a), Congress carried the policy contained in § 14 of
the 1933 Act into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. True it is not a word for word
replica, but it explicitly includes any rule or regulation thereunder which refers to 'any
provision of this chapter.' " [d.
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similar to common law actions in their elements than actions
under section 12(2) and therefore more easily dealt with by an
arbitrator, it can be argued that courts need not show as much
concern for Rule lOb-5 actions as for actions under section
12(2).66
During the period following Wilko, the Securities and Ex
change Commission ("SEC") supported the view in opposition to
arbitration of securities claims. 67 In 1983, the SEC took the fur
ther step of attempting to regulate broker agreements concerning
arbitration by adopting Rule 15c2-2.66 Rule 15c2-2 declared it a
fraudulent act for a broker or dealer to enter into a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement with a public customer which purported to
apply to disputes arising under the federal securities laws.
In adopting Rule 15c2-2, the SEC pointed out its long support
for the concept of arbitration of securities disputes as an alterna
tive to litigation, but not when it was based on an agreement be
tween brokers and their customers to arbitrate future disputes. 69
The SEC took the position that Wilko must be read to bar all
pre-dispute arbitration agreements for all federal claims arising
under statutes that have anti-waiver provisions similar to that in
the Securities Act. 70 While the language of Rule 15c2-2 gave the
impression that it was a deceptive act to include an arbitration
clause in a customer's agreement, the purpose of Rule 15c2-2 was
to insure that public customers were not deceived into believing
that they had waived their right to a judicial resolution of a fed
eral securities claim, which would be invalid under the Wilko
66. See, e.g., Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25.
67. Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 82,122 (July 2,
1979).
68. Rule 15c2-2 provided in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a bro
ker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which pur
ports to bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them
arising under the federal securities laws or to have in effect such an agreement,
pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for a customer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15C2-2 (1985). This rule was rescinded after the Supreme Court's decision
in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). Exchange Act
Release No. 25,035, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 84,163 (Oct. 15,
1987).
69. Exchange Act Release No. 19,813, [1982-1983] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 83,356
(May 26, 1983) (setting forth the SEC's history of support for arbitration as an economical
alternative); Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-1984] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) "
83,452 (Nov. 18, 1983).
70. Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, supra note 68, " 83,452 at 86,357 & n.6.
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principles. 71
Thus, in the years after Wilko, both the SEC and the courts
seemed fairly confident of the view that claims asserted under the
federal securities laws, primarily the Securities Act and the Ex
change Act, were clear exceptions to the Arbitration Act; there
fore, pre-dispute arbitration agreements between the broker and
customer were not enforced with regard to these claims. 72

IV.

JUDICIAL RECONSIDERATION

The question of the arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims, while
seemingly settled by the lower courts, had not been decided by
the Supreme Court. In 1985, the question was opened for new
consideration by the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. u. Byrd. 73 After the lower courts had come to con
flicting decisions in reexamining this question, the Court ulti
mately concluded in Shearson/American Express, Inc. u. McMa
hon," that Rule lOb-5 claims are arbitrable. In order to
understand the basis for the McMahon decision and to consider
whether it provides a satisfactory resolution of the issue, it is nec
essary to first consider Byrd, and the conflicts to which it led.
A.

The Byrd Decision

In Byrd, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of arbi
71. [d. at 86,356-58. In fact, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation subsequently indi
cated it would not recommend that action be taken under Rule 15c2-2 for a clause drafted
by the Securities Industry Association for inclusion in its member's customer agreements
which provided in pertinent part: "It is understood that the following agreement to arbi
trate does not constitute a waiver of the right to seek a judicial forum where such a waiver
would be void under the federal securities laws." [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 41, at 1860 (Oct. 18, 1985).
72. The SEC showed this confidence that the law on this question was settled when it
stated:
In sum, the judicial decisions involving the applicability of Section 14 of the
Act and Section 29 of the Exchange Act to customer arbitration agreements have
delineated a set of investor-broker disputes for which arbitration may not be
compelled pursuant to the arbitration clause of a customer agreement entered
into at the time of opening an account or at any time prior to the dispute.
Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, supra note 67, 11 82,122, at 81,977; Exchange Act Release
No. 20,397, [1983-1984] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 83,452. The Supreme Court noted that this
language only stated what the SEC thought courts of appeals were deciding in this area
and did not show the "independent analysis" that would shed light on the issue. Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2341 n.3 (1987).
73. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
74. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
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trability of a Rule 10b-5 claim, but rather the related problem of
determining the treatment of state law claims that are filed with
federal securities claims when there is a request for arbitration
under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Under the Arbitration
Act, the state law claims would normally be sent to arbitration
since there was no federal concern that would implicate Wilko.711
Some federal courts, however, were concerned about the conse
quences of such a procedure in the event the state law claim arose
out of the same transaction as the federal claim. To send such
state law claims to arbitration raised questions of economy, since
many of the same issues would be addressed in both forums. In
addition, there was concern that an arbitrator's resolution of is
sues might estop the federal court from considering those issues,
thus depriving the plaintiff of his or her right to a federal forum.
As a result, a number of courts concluded that the claims were so
"intertwined" that the state claims should also be retained in fed
eral court and not submitted to arbitration. 76
In Byrd, a federal claim was asserted under Rule 10b-5, and the
defendant asked the district court to submit the state law claims
to arbitration. The defendant assumed that the arbitration clause
could not be used to force the Rule 10b-5 claim into arbitration,
and therefore did not request arbitration of the federal claim."
As a result, the Supreme Court refused to consider whether a
Rule lOb-5 claim would be subject to arbitration. 78 The Court did
hold, however, that if state and federal claims are brought in a
single complaint when a pre-dispute arbitration agreement exists,
the state law claims must be sent to arbitration even if it creates
bifurcated proceedings. 79 The closest the majority came to ad
75. It is clear today that the Arbitration Act applies to state law ciaims if they involve
transactions involving commerce or maritime matters. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 & 3 (1982); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956). This is so, even if the claims are
asserted in state court. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1984); Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) (dicta).
The Arbitration Act, however, apparently does not create federal question jurisdiction.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32 (dicta); Hirshman, supra note 22,
at 1341.
76. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopted this position while the Sixth, Sev
enth and Eighth Circuits rejected the intertwining doctrine. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 270 & nn.3,
4 (citing cases).
77. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215.
78. [d. at 215-16 n.l.
79. The Court concluded that the delay inherent in a bifurcated proceeding was not a
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dressing the issue of the arbitrability of the Rule 10b-5 claims was
a footnote which traced the history of the non-arbitrability prin
ciple. 8o In that discussion, the Court referred to its decision in
Scherk v. Alberto Culver CO.81 which had questioned the applica
bility of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 claims. 82
In a concurring opinion, Justice White pointed out that there
was substantial doubt as to whether Wilko would apply to claims
under the Exchange Act. 83 In his view, the three interconnecting
factors which led to the Wilko decision-the waiver language of
section 14 of the Securities Act; the differences between the ele
ments of a section 12(2) claim and a common law claim; and the
expanded jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Act-were
not present in a Rule lOb-5 claim. In support of this view, Justice
White also cited Scherk. 84 While agreeing that the question was
not before the Court, Justice White asked lower courts to recon
sider the question.
The Byrd decision, especially Justice White's concurring opin
ion, precipitated a reconsideration of the coverage of Wilko. 81i
This reconsideration was also suggested by the Court's decision in
Scherk and in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym
strong enough federal interest, absent "a countervailing policy manifested in another fed
eral statute," to overcome the strong congressional interest, evidenced in the Arbitration
Act, to enforce private agreements to arbitrate. [d. at 221. This analysis by the Court is
analogous to the approach that it has taken with respect to pendent and ancillary jurisdic
tion, where the Court has refused to allow lower federal courts to assert jurisdiction over a
"common nucleus of operative facts" for reasons of judicial economy where Congress has
negated the assertion of jurisdiction. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I, 14-18 (1976). Similarly, the Arbitration Act
effectively negates any attempt by the federal courts to assert control over the state law
claims on grounds of economy.
The Court in Byrd also rejected the argument that the state law claims should be re
tained to avoid a situation in which the federal court might be collaterally estopped from
reconsidering an issue previously decided in arbitration. The Court suggested, without de
ciding, that preclusion might not be appropriate, and that the courts should fashion rules
to protect federal interests. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221-23 (citing McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88 (1984)); see infra note 174.
80. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.l.
81. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see infra note 87.
82. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14.
83. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring). A criticism of Justice White's rea
soni.ng is set out in Comment, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 565-71.
84. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225.
85. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2348-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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outh, Inc. 86 In both of these cases the Supreme Court sent claims
asserted under federal law to arbitration pursuant to pre-dispute
agreements. Each case involved an international transaction: the
Scherk claim was asserted under Rule 10b-5, and the Mitsubishi
Motors claim involved allegations of antitrust violations under
the Sherman Act. 87 In each case, the plaintiff argued that, under
the reasoning of Wilko, the claim should not be consigned to the
arbitration process. The Supreme Court held in both cases that
the claims should be sent to arbitration because an international
transaction was involved, and because principles of comity re
quired enforcement of international arbitration provisions. 88 The
Court questioned, however, whether the claims asserted would
have been non-arbitrable if they had been domestic claims.
In Scherk, the Court first made its "colorable argument" that
Wilko did not apply to Rule lOb-5 claims. The Court reasoned
that because Congress did not provide an express private remedy
86. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
87. In Scherk, the plaintiff, an American corporation, purchased certain foreign busi
nesses from a German citizen. The contract contained a provision providing for the arbi
tration of disputes. When the plaintiff discovered that the trademark rights purchased
under the contract had encumbrances which affected their value, it brought suit to rescind
the contract claiming fraudulent misrepresentations in violation of Rule 10b-5. The dis
trict court rejected a motion for a stay pending arbitration and enjoined the defendant
from proceeding with the arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af
firmed. Both lower courts relied on Wilko in deciding the case, Scherk v. Alberto Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508-10 (1974).
In Mitsubishi Motors, a Puerto Rico corporation entered into a distribution agreement
to sell vehicles built by Mitsubishi, a Japanese manufacturer of automobiles. As part of
this arrangement, the parties entered into a sales agreement which included an arbitration
clause. When problems arose concerning the distribution of vehicles, Mitsubishi filed suit
in the Federal District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel
arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Jurisdiction in the case was based on 9 U.S.C. §
201 (1982), which authorizes district courts to enforce arbitration agreements under "The
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of June
10, 1958." The defendant counterclaimetl based upon various grounds, including a Sher
man Act claim. The district court refused to send several of the claims, including the
antitrust claim, to arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and
ordered the antitrust claim to arbitration on the grounds that it involved an international
transaction. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 616-24.
88. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-20; Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629. In Mitsubishi Mo
tors the Court stated:
As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., we conclude that concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacity of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensi
tivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Id. (citations omitted).

1989]

ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION

559

as it did under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, Rule 10b-5
claims did not evince a congressional concern by the establish
ment of a "special right" which required a judicial forum. 89 More
over, the Court noted that while there were anti-waiver provisions
in both statutes, the Exchange Act lacked the type of provisions
that the court in Wilko was concerned with. 90
In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court sought to clarify its position in
response to the argument that, under the Arbitration Act, the
Court should not construe arbitration agreements to cover any
federal statutory claim unless the agreement specifically refers to
that claim. 91 The Court rejected this presumption against arbitra
tion and indicated that each statute had to be examined to deter
mine whether its text or legislative history evinced a congres
sional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial remedy.92
In balancing the various arguments in opposition to the arbitra
89. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14; see supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
90. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514. Specifically, the Court stated:
Furthermore, while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of compliance with any "provision"
of the respective Acts, certain of the "provisions" of the 1933 Act that the Court

held could not be waived by Wilko's agreement to arbitrate find no counterpart
in the 1934 Act. In particular, the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional
provision of the 1933 Act. . . allowed a plaintiff to bring suit "in any court of
competent jurisdiction-federal or state-and removal from a state court is pro
hibited." . . . The analogous provision of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for
suit only in the federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction," ...
thus significantly restricting the plaintiffs choice of forum.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
91. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 624-25. While the basis for this argument is not
clear, it is arguable that the existence of a statutory claim showed Congress's intent to
reserve the matter to the courts, and therefore only an express waiver should be enforced.
Moreover, the dissent argued that "[n]othing in the text of the [Arbitration] Act, nor its
legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of any
statutory claims." Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Black's dissent in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418 (1967) and Cohen &
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926».
92. Id. at 625-28. The Court concluded that, in light of the federal policy favoring arbi
tration, issues concerning the scope of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbi
tration. Once it is decided that the agreement requires arbitration, it is appropriate to
examine the statute which creates the claim to determine if Congress has taken a negative
position toward arbitration of the claim. As the Court stated:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act
that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements
covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other
statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.
Id. at 627.
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tion of antitrust cases93 against the "strong belief in the efficacy
of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international commer
cial disputes,"9' the Court in Mitsubishi Motors, reviewed the
concerns which led the federal courts of appeals which had ad
dressed the issue to unanimously reject arbitration in antitrust
cases. 9 /1 In the course of its decision, the Court showed strong sup
port for the arbitration process. In addressing the argument that
antitrust cases were too complex for the arbitral process, the
Court pointed out that, with the proper selection of arbitrators
based on the nature of the claim and the effective use of experts,
arbitration is capable of effectively handling antitrust claims,
while at the same time limiting the costs and time involved in the
process. 96 Moreover, the Court was unwilling to accept the pro
position that arbitrators would be inherently hostile to business
restraints since it assumed that the process of selection would
protect against such a bias. 97 Finally, the Court reasoned that the
availability of court review of the arbitration decision at the time
of enforcement would insure that the arbitration process fur
thered the public interest in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws. 96
93. The Court summarized the arguments against arbitration as follows:
First, private parties playa pivotal role in aiding governmental enforcement of
the antitrust laws by means of the private action for treble damages. Second,
"the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust disputes may be
contracts of adhesion militates against automatic forum determination by con
tract." Third, antitrust issues, prone to complication, require sophisticated legal
and economic analysis, and thus are "ill-adapted to strengths of the arbitral pro
cess, i.e., expedition, minimal requirements of written rationale, simplicity, re
sort to basic concepts of common sense and simple equity." Finally, just as "is
sues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals, ...
decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in
arbitrators chosen from the business community-particularly those from a for
eign community that has had no experience with or exposure to our law and
values."
[d. at 632 (quoting the opinion below, 723 F.2d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1983) as having "dis
tilled" the doctrines against arbitration of antitrust regulations from American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1968».
94. Mitsubi.~hi Motors, 473 U.S. at 631.
95. [d. at 628-40. The view that antitrust claims were non-arbitrable had been accepted
by the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. [d. at 655-57 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases).
96. [d. at 633-34.
97. [d. at 634.
98. [d. at 636-38. While this conclusion was based on the enforcement provisions of
"The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June
10, 1958," id. at 638 (citing art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520), the general tenor of the
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The decision in Scherk, standing alone, did not have much im
pact on the lower federal courts' denial of arbitration of federal
statutory claims, particularly in the Rule lOb-5 area. 99 The addi
tion, however, of the decisions in Mitsubishi Motors and
Byrd-especially Byrd, with its concurring opinion by Justice
White-caused many lower federal courts to reevaluate earlier de
cisions on this question. loo The lower courts split on the issue;
some relied on Wilko to limit the use of arbitration, while others
supported the use of the arbitration process as a means of dealing
with these claims. In order to appreciate the differences between
these two approaches, it is appropriate to examine some of the
judicial responses to these Supreme Court decisions.

B. Conflicting Circuit Views
The courts of appeals that considered the question after Byrd
divided on the question of the arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims.
In some cases, the courts felt bound by earlier circuit decisions lol
concluding that since the question had not been specifically ad
dressed by the Supreme Court in the period since Wilko, they
would not find that these claims were arbitrable. lo2
Court's analysis suggested a greater willingness to inquire into an arbitration decision than
shown in Wilko. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44; see infra note 194.
99. For example, in Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that "significant
policies reflected in the securities laws and the Bankruptcy Act" required that a motion to
compel arbitration be denied, despite the fact that Scherk had been decided and that the
defendants cited to it. [d.
100. At the time that Shearson/American Express Inc. petitioned for certiorari, it stated
that 118 cases on this point had been decided since Byrd, with 76 decisions to send claims
to arbitration and 42 cases refusing to do so. Petition for Certiorari at n.1 and Appendix E,
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
101. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197, 1201
(3d Cir. 1986); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1986).
102. In Jacobson, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that an earlier
decision rejected Scherk as limiting Wilko, and concluded that the existence of similar
anti-waiver provisions in the Securities Act and Exchange Act warranted treating them
the same. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1201 (citing Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1976». The court stated that the majority in Byrd
had expressly declined to consider the question of the applicability of Wilko in this area.
[d. at 1201. Finally, the court concluded that the only concern in Mitsubishi Motors was
the interpretation of an arbitration agreement, and therefore Mitsubishi Motors did not
provide contrary precedent. [d. at 1201-02. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the
court sent the RICO claims to arbitration since there is no anti-waiver provision in that
statute, except in those cases where the predicate acts were violations of Rule lOb-5. [d. at
1202-03.
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While continuing to prohibit the arbitration of Rule 10b-5
claims, some courts found it appropriate to consider the area
more fully before making a determination. l03 In some cases, de
spite the existence of circuit precedent in support of non-arbi
trability,tM the courts chose to consider whether Scherk's "colora
ble argument" and Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd
required a different result. 1011 These courts focused on the similar
ity between the anti-waiver provisions of the two securities stat
utes involved,108 and the fact that plaintiffs in each case were
seeking special rights which required a judicial forum.l07 While it
was argued that Mitsubishi Motors suggested that the develop
ment of arbitration made the need for a judicial forum less im
portant, the courts did not consider such a possibility as a suffi
cient reason for treating Rule 10b-5 claims differently from
section 12(2) claims.l08 In addition, the courts viewed the special
jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act as evidence of a
The King opinion was much briefer than Jacobson. It simply pointed out that since
Byrd had not addressed the question, the court would follow its prior decisions. King, 796
F.2d at 60.
103. The opinion of the court of appeals in Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808
F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1987), is a hybrid that relied on circuit precedent for its decision, id. at
482-83 (citing Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979)), but
also analyzed Wilko. The court stated:
Wilko weighed the policy favoring arbitration against the policy inherent in the
anti-fraud protection of the securities laws involved, and felt that the latter poli
cies were weightier and should prevail. Although there are differences between
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the rationale of Wilko persuades us that, despite his
agreement to do so, Sterne should not be compelled to arbitrate.
[d. at 483.
104. See, e.g., Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1986); McMa
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
2332 (1987).
105. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1035 (recognizing that Wilko is distinguishable, and so
not controlling, but stating that the question is whether the similarities are such that the
court should follow Wilko's reasoning); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d
520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that it would consider the matter "in light of the ques
tions raised by Justice White") vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3202 (1987), rev'd per curium, 837 F.2d
867 (9th Cir. 1988); McMahon, 788 F.2d at 97-98 (considering the Scherk and Byrd argu
ments but stating that it would be "improvident" to disregard clear judicial precedent).
106. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1036; Conover, 794 F.2d at 523; McMahon, 788 F.2d at
96-97.
107. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1035; Conover, 794 F.2d at 524; McMahon, 788 F.2d at
98.
108. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037 (suggesting that even if the need for a judicial
forum was "less compelling" because of improvements in arbitration, it had not changed
the result in section 12(2) cases and there was no legitimate basis for treating claims under
Rule 10b-5 and section 12(2) differently for purposes of arbitration).
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strong congressional concern with providing a judicial forum m
the same manner as the Securities Act provisions. 109
Having considered these points, two of the courts looked to
support their position against arbitration of Rule 10b-5 claims by
considering Congress's 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act.l1O
One provision of those amendments specifically authorized com
pulsory arbitration of securities claims between securities profes
sionals. l l l In reference to this amendment, the Conference Report
stated:
The Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings be
tween self-regulatory organizations and their participants, mem
bers, or persons dealing with members or participants. The
House amendment contained no comparable provision. The
House receded to the Senate. It was the clear understanding of
the conferees that this amendment did not change existing law,
as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), concerning
the effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements en
tered into by persons dealing with members and participants of
self-regulatory organizations. ll2

An examination of this language shows its ambiguity, since it is
unclear whether Congress was endorsing Wilko for section 12(2)
cases, the extension of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 cases, or the use of
Wilko limited by the "colorable argument" language of Scherk,
which had been decided in 1974.113 The two courts of appeals
109. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1036; Conover, 794 F.2d at 523.
110. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037-38; Conover, 794 F.2d at 524.
111. Section 28(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended to read:
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to modify existing law with
regard to the binding effect (1) on any member of or participant in any self
regulatory organization of any action taken by the authorities of such organiza
tion to settle disputes between its members or participants, (2) on any municipal
securities dealer or municipal securities broker of any action taken pursuant to a
procedure established by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board to settle
disputes between municipal securities dealers and municipal securities brokers,
or (3) of any action described in paragraph (1) or (2) on any person who has
agreed to be bound thereby.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982).
112. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 321, 342.
113. To illustrate this point, the court in Wolfe noted that each side had cited this
language as supporting its position. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037. The Supreme Court empha
sized the ambiguity of this language in discounting its significance in deciding McMahon,
107 S. Ct. at 2343. See infra note 155.
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which ruled in favor of non-arbitrability, however, gave this lan
guage some weight as supporting their position.lH
The two courts of appeals which decided in favor of arbitration
of Rule 10b-5 claims during this period considered the same argu
ments but came to a different conclusion. lul These courts found
persuasive the distinctions noted by the Supreme Court between
claims arising under Rule 10b-5 and claims to which Wilko was
applicable; reference was made to the narrower jurisdictional pro
vision of the Exchange Act, and the difference between express
and implied remedies. The decisions, however, lacked a clear
analysis of why these distinctions should lead to different results,
other than to state that the distinctions indicated that Congress
did not intend to override the strong federal policy favoring en
forcement of arbitration agreements embodied in the Arbitration
Act. HS Both courts agreed that the rule permitting arbitration of
114. Although the Eleventh Circuit in Wolfe recognized that the language of the Con
ference Report could be taken as nothing more than an "endorsement of Wilko," the court
viewed the failure of Congress to disavow the application of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 claims as
supportive of its position. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037-38.
The Ninth Circuit went further and found the legislative history "compelling" on the
question of the application of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 claims. Conover, 794 F.2d at 524 (citing
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 538 F.2d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 1976). It found
additional support in the fact that Congress had ratified the judicial remedy under Rule
10b-5 by not acting to eliminate it. [d. at 524 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983)). The Conover court also noted that the SEC asserted that
brokers had to make customers aware of their rights to a judicial forum under the Securi
ties Act and Exchange Act, notwithstanding any prior agreements to arbitrate. Id. at 524
(citing Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, supra note 67); see supra text accompanying
notes 67-72. But see Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480, 481 (6th Cir.
1987) (The court indicated that the Securities Exchange Association, Inc. had filed an
amicus curiae brief supporting the defendant's position that the Rule 10b-5 claim should
be sent to arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute agreement.).
115. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986);
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
116. As the First Circuit stated:
[Tlhe 1934 Act, unlike the 1933 Act, does not expressly provide individuals a
right to·a judicial forum. Because of the absence of any express "provision" for a
judicial forum under the 1934 Act, we conclude that the 1934 Act's anti-waiver
clause, by itself, does not suffice to indicate a Congressional intent to preclude
arbitration.
Page, 806 F.2d at 296 (footnote omitted).
The Eighth Circuit went somewhat further in Phillips and pointed out not only the
express/implied distinction, but that the Securities Act provides a choice of forum, not
exclusive jurisdiction as the Exchange Act does. The court also pointed out that the Secur
ities Act, unlike the Exchange Act and common-law securities actions, does not require a
plaintiff to prove scienter in order to recover, thus creating a special right. Phillips, 795
F.2d at 1397-98. Interestingly, the First Circuit thought that the exclusive jurisdiction "ar
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Rule 10b-5 claims was not changed by the 1975 amendments to
the Exchange Act since it was not clear what Congress had meant
by its statement concerning Wilko. ll7 The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit explicitly relied on the Supreme Court's view in
Mitsubishi Motors that the modern process of arbitration was ca
pable of handling complex federal statutory rights. 118 Therefore,
the court concluded that it was inappropriate to consider "the al
leged ineffectiveness of the arbitral forum in deciding the arbi
trability of a federal statutory right."u9

C. Analysis of Conflicting Views
The conflict which arose among the courts of appeals in analyz
ing the arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims in the period after Byrd
was primarily centered around two main points. The first point
arose out of the suggestion in Scherk that Rule 10b-5 claims were
distinguishable from section 12(2) claims and therefore the Wilko
analysis should not apply. Much of the discussion of questions
such as the distinction between express and implied remedies, for
example, centered on this aspect of the analysis. The second
point of dispute was whether Rule 10b-5 claims standing alone
warranted an exception to the Arbitration Act's principle of arbi
trability. This analysis moved away from the "colorable argu
ment" questions, and instead sought to examine Congress's inten
tions in this area. Each of these points will be analyzed more fully
in order to judge the merits of the positions taken.
The arguments concerning the distinction between the Rule
lOb-5 and section 12(2) claims centered around the three main
elements which led to the Wilko decision: 120 (1) the existence of
the anti-waiver provision in section 14 of the Securities Act;121 (2)
the special nature of the right under section 12(2) of the Securi
guably" indicated the importance of a federal court forum. Page, 806 F.2d at 296.
117. Page, 806 F.2d at 296-97 n.10; Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1398 n.17. The Eighth Circuit
in Phillips also disposed of the plaintiffs' argument that Rule 15c2-2 supported their posi
tion by pointing out that the rule was promulgated after the contracts involved in the case
had been executed, and also that it did nothing more than state the SEC's interpretation
of the present law. The court stated that it disagreed with the SEC analysis. [d.; see supra
note 72.
118. Page, 806 F.2d at 297 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
473 U.S. 614 (1985)); see supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
119. Page, 806 F.2d at 297.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
121. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
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ties Act which was substantively complex and therefore not to be
entrusted to other than a judicial forum;122 and (3) the special
jurisdictional provisions which allowed plaintiffs to choose a state
or federal forum, and to refuse removal if a state forum was cho
sen-thus showing a clear preference for a judicial determination
of the issues raised. 123 By critically reviewing these factors in light
of the cases already considered, it is possible to evaluate their ap
propriateness as a basis for decision.
1. Statutory Anti-Waiver Provision

This first element requires the court to consider the applicable
statutory claim to determine whether Congress intended to over
ride the basic federal policy set forth in the Arbitration Act. 124
The policy of the Arbitration Act is to encourage arbitration by
directing courts to enforce arbitration contracts in the same man
ner as they would any other contract. 126 In considering the section
12(2) claim under the Securities Act, the Wilko Court found the
congressional intent to override that policy in the language of sec
tion 14 of the Securities Act. Section 14 prohibits the enforce
ment of any pre-dispute provision which purports to "waive com
pliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission. 1I126 While the language of section
29 of the Exchange Act is essentially the same, a different result
may be warranted. 127 As stated in Scherk l28 and by Justice White
in Byrd,129 the investor is not "waiving compliance with any pro
vision of this title" with respect to the Exchange Act, because no
122. [d. at 436-38.
123. [d. at 435.
124. [d. The decisions examined focus on this concern with regard to congressional in
tent. As the Supreme Court stated in Mitsubishi Motors:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act
that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements
covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other
statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627.
125. See supra notes 23-24 arid accompanying text.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (see supra text accompanying note 35 for the text of section 14);
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35 ("This arrangement to arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we think
the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under
§ 14 of the Securities Act.").
127. See supra note 65.
128. 417 U.S. at 513-14.
129. 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
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provision of the statute authorizes a private right of action under
Rule 10b-5; therefore, the non-waiver provision is arguably inap
plicable. If this position is accepted, there is no evidence of a con
gressional intent to override the general federal policy in favor of
arbitration.
Taken at face value, it is clear that there is a distinction be
tween section 12(2) actions under the Securities Act, and implied
actions under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. It is not clear,
however, whether that distinction should make a difference in the
treatment of the waiver provision in the two cases. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it will not imply
a private right of action under a federal statute unless it finds
evidence of congressional intent in the statutory language or legis
lative history to authorize such action. 130 Once that intent is es
tablished and the court implies the private right of action, the
right of action is subject to the express jurisdictional provision of
the statute, which requires the federal court to hear the case. 131
Applying this reasoning to the Wilko analysis, once an implied
claim is established it is required to be heard in federal court;
enforcement of an arbitration agreement would therefore permit
a waiver of the jurisdictional provision of the statute. If the Wilko
Court was concerned about protecting the plaintiffs choice of fo
rum, which Congress had granted through the jurisdictional pro
visions of the Securities Act, it is arguable· that a court should
also be careful to preserve the Exchange Act jurisdictional provi
sion, which indicates that Congress wanted these claims heard ex
clusively in federal court. Thus, this element of the Wilko analy
sis does not present a compelling reason for a different treatment
of these two types of claims on the issue of arbitrability.
2.

Sp~cial

Nature of the Right

Even if the anti-waiver provision, standing alone, does not pre
sent a compelling reason for treating these claims differently, it
130. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ("[W)hat
must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
asserted . . . ."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The Court stated
that "our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the
private right of action," id. at 568, and further stated that "[t)he central inquiry remains
whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of
action," id. at 575.
131. R JENNINGS & J. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 811 (5th ed. 1982).
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can be argued that it does so when reviewed in light of the special
nature of the section 12(2) claim. In Wilko, the Court pointed out
that since section 12(2) claims create special rights intended to
protect investors, whom Congress viewed as operating at a disad
vantage in dealing with issuers and dealers, it was important to
determine if that protection would be lessened by allowing arbi
tration. ls2 The Court was concerned that the arbitration process
was not equipped to decide the numerous complex legal questions
of vital federal concern which section 12(2) raises. 133 In its view,
arbitration was best suited for the resolution of simple questions,
and nothing more. IS' This was particularly troubling for the Court
because the arbitrators' decision would only be subject to limited
review.l3Ii To the extent that this presents a strong reason for de
nying arbitration, it equally applies to Rule lOb-5 cases. While
the issues raised are different from those under section 12(2),
there is an ever increasing number of complex legal issues which
must be resolved in many Rule 10b-5 cases. IS6 If, as the Court
suggested, arbitrators are ill-prepared to deal with legal questions
under section 12(2), it would seem that the same concerns would
be present under Rule lOb-5, which has been used extensively for
the protection of investors over the past thirty years. IS7
132. Wilko, 346 u.s. at 435-37; Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806
F.2d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 1986).
133. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436; Page, 806 F.2d at 296. The Wilko Court focused on issues
of "burden of proof," "reasonable care," and "material fact." A full discussion of the ele
ments of section 12(2) is set out in L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1021-29.
134. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted), where the Court stated:
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer,
apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to
judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality of a commodity or the amount
of money due under a contract is not the type of issue here involved. This case
requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator
of the Act.
135. [d.
136. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) ("scienter" requirement);
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), reh'g denied, 407
U.S. 916 (reliance and causation); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976) (materiality raised in the context of a proxy context, but relevant to Rule 10b-5
claims); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (standing to bring a private
action under Rule lOb-5).
137. A detailed analysis of the development of Rule 10b-5 is set out in L. Loss, supra
note 2, at 820-944.
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3. Special Jurisdictional Provisions
The concern with respect to the special jurisdictional provisions
relates to the previously discussed waiver issue. Under the Securi
ties Act, Congress provided investors with an advantage in that
they have the power to choose a federal or a non-removable state
forum. The Court in Wilko was reluctant to take away this ad
vantage by enforcing an arbitration provision. lsB The Exchange
Act does not provide the same advantage since it does not give
the investor plaintiff a jurisdictional choice, but it does give the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims.ls9
If the Court is reluctant to enforce a waiver of an expansive juris
dictional right given to investors by Congress, the Court should
also be reluctant to do so in a statutory setting in which Congress
felt so strongly about the claims that it provided exclusive juris
diction to the federal courts. 140 The arbitration provision would
138. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. The jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act of 1933
states:
Sec. 22. (a) The district courts of the United States, and United States courts
of any Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this
subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this subchapter.... No case arising under this subchapter and brought in any
State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the
United States.
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
139. Section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934 provides:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regula
tions thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations there
under ....
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
140. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 654-57
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc.,
806 F.2d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that the existence of exclusive federal jurisdiction
arguably allows "for the inference that Congress regarded the federal court forum to be an
important one"); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986)
(comparing the jurisdictional provisions under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
and stating that the exclusive jurisdiction provision is "an even more forceful indication of
Congress' intent that the federal courts oversee the interpretation and application of the
1934 Act"), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987), rev'd per curiam, 837 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1988).
An expansive discussion of exclusive jurisdiction under the securities laws, and possible
limits thereon, is set out in Dickinson, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Role of
States in Securities Regulation, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (1980).
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allow an arbitrator to decide a case which Congress has prohib
ited a state court from deciding. It would be incongruous to dis
tinguish the treatment of section 12(2) claims and Rule 10b-5
claims based on the difference in these jurisdictional provisions.
After examining the factors considered by the Court in Wilko,
the only distinction between the two claims which has any merit
is that implied rights of actions are different from specifically
granted statutory causes of action. Arguably the specifically
granted statutory right evidences a clear Congressional intent to
override the Arbitration Act's policy in favor of arbitration, and,
in a technical sense, the implied right of action does not fit within
the statutory waiver language of the statutes. HI In a real sense,
however, this seems to be an argument in favor of formalism as
the basis for decision-making. As such, there appears to be no
principled reason for distinguishing cases under Rule lOb-5 and
section 12(2) on the issue of arbitrability.
Perhaps because of the lack of a basis for distinguishing the
claims, the Supreme Court, in considering the question of the
arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon,142 chose to focus on the second point of dis
pute: whether Congress had intended to exempt Rule 10b-5
claims from the Arbitration Act. While the Court considered
Wilko relevant in analyzing this question, the Court declined to
distinguish the results in the two situations. H3 Thus, in consider
ing the second point of dispute, it is appropriate to examine
McMahon.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
142. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
143. Justice O'Connor made this clear when she stated: "While stare decisis concerns
may counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the Securities Act, we
refuse to extend Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act in light of the intervening regula
tory developments." ld. at 2341. Justice Blackmun emphasized the majority's failure to
address this distinction when he stated:
There is no need to discuss in any detail that "colorable argument" which rests
on alleged distinctions between pertinent provisions of the. Securities Act and
those of the Exchange Act, because the court does not rely upon it today. In
fact, the "argument" is important not so much for its substance as it is for its
litigation role. It simply constituted a way of keeping the issue of arbitrability of
§ 10(b) claims alive for those opposed to the result in Wilko.
ld. at 2346-47 (footnotes omitted) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The refusal to attempt to distinguish the two Acts was supported by the SEC in its
amicus curiae brief, Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 18-26, which was also cited by
Justice Blackmun in McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2347 n.2.

,
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The McMahon Decision

In McMahon, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which refused to allow
arbitration of both a Rule 10b-5 claim and a RICO claim under a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement. H4 The court of appeals de
clined to follow the defendants' suggestion that the court should
revise its view that Rule 10b-5 claims are not arbitrable on the
basis of the Scherk opinion and Justice White's concurrence in
Byrd. The court concluded that the public interest in deterrence
of misconduct in the securities industry necessitated judicial con
trol. 14CI The court stated:
[T]he similarity of the non-waiver provisions, § 14 of the 1933
Act and § 29(a) of the 1934 Act, as well as the strong public
policy concerns inherent in the securities laws and the legislative
history that preceded their enactment, support the compelling
.need for a judicial forum in the resolution of securities law dis
putes. Although Scherk and Byrd may cast some doubt on
whether the Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would
hold claims under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 to be non-arbitrable,
it would be improvident for us to disregard clear judicial prece
dent in this Circuit based on mere speculation. We think that
the orderly administration of justice will be best served if we as
one of the inferior courts follow Supreme Court precedent and
adhere to the settled law of this Circuit, and a fortiori the dis
trict courts should do likewise. 146
144. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986). The
Second Circuit reversed a district court decision to send the Rule 10b-5 claim to arbitra
tion, but upheld the decision not to send the RICO claim to arbitration. [d. The district
court relied on Scherk and Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd in allowing arbitra
tion of the Rule 10b-5 claim. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The district court's decision not to send the RICO claim to arbitration was based on
what it viewed as "important federal policies inherent in the enforcement of RICO by the
federal courts." [d. at 387. In affirming this decision, the court of appeals stated that
RICO claims, like antitrust claims, fall into a special category of strong public interest
which requires a judicial determination to develop a record and to insure "judicial clarifi
cation and resulting consistency in resolving disputes under this relatively new statute."
McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98-99.
The Supreme Court unanimously decided that RICO claims were arbitrable under a
pre-dispute agreement because there was no basis for concluding that Congress intended
to exempt these claims from the Arbitration Act, nor that arbitration could not effectively
handle these claims. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343
46 (1987).
145. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98.
146. [d.
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The Supreme Court began by pointing out that it was the
plaintiff's burden to establish, through "the text, history, or pur
poses of the statute"I47 which was the basis of the suit, that Con
gress had intended to mandate an exception to the Arbitration
Act's general policy of enforcing arbitration agreements. 14S To
meet this burden the plaintiff made three arguments, all of which
were rejected by the Court.
The plaintiff argued that the anti-waiver provision of section 29
of the Exchange Act evidenced a congressional intent to override
the mandate of the Arbitration Act.u9 This intent was clear be
cause section 29 prohibits a waiver of the exclusive jurisdiction
provision of the Exchange Act. This argument presented an op
portunity for the Court to establish a position consistent with the
earlier statements of Justice White by pointing out the distinc
tion between express and implied rights of action, as well as other
distinctions between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. In
stead, the Court addressed what it deemed to be the meaning of
section 29 in light of its reading of Wilko.lIIO It rejected the view
that section 29 prohibits the waiver of a judicial forum per se,
and instead read Wilko "as barring waiver of a judicial forum
only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive
rights at issue. "Ul Having focused on section 29 as the primary
source of congressional intent to negate the policies of the Arbi
tration Act, and having limited that section's significance to the
question of the adequacy of arbitration, the Court addressed the
issue of whether arbitration was adequate for Rule 10b-5
claims. 1112
147. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
148. [d. at 2337-38.
149. [d. at 2338-39. See supra note 56 for the text of section 29.
150. The Court may have been influenced by the SEC's amicus curiae brief which sup
ported arbitration of the Rule 1Ob-5 claim. In its brief, the SEC urged the Court not to
distinguish between Securities Act and Exchange Act claims in deciding to arbitrate Rule
10b-5 claims. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 21-26.
151. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-39 (citing Scherk and concluding that its decision in
that case had turned on its determination that arbitration was adequate to protect the
parties' statutory rights).
152. The plaintiffs second argument was that section 29 prohibits pre-dispute arbitra
tion agreements because of the unequal bargaining positions of the parties. The Court
rejected this argument, stating that the only issue was whether the agreement would waive
a statutory duty by limiting the plaintiffs ability to recover under the Act. If the answer
to this was in the affirmative, then it would be irrelevant whether the agreement was
voluntary or involuntary. [d. at 2339.
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In order to explore this issue, the Court had to address the un
derlying rationale of Wilko: the concern that the arbitration pro
cess was not capable of dealing with these issues. m Recognizing
that the Wilko decision reflected judicial mistrust of arbitration,
the Court stated that such mistrust was inconsistent with its sub
sequent decisions, which had concluded that arbitration was ca
pable of handling complex matters. 1M
The Court found additional support for its view that there was
no longer any basis for mistrusting arbitration in the 1975 amend
ments to the Exchange Act. While the Court found the reference
to Wilko in the legislative history of the amendments unhelpful,
the Court gave great weight to the amendment to section 19,
which provided the SEC with extensive power to regulate the ar
bitration procedures approved by the various stock exchanges and
registered securities associations. ll111 The grant of broad regulatory
power satisfied the Court that, at least where arbitration proce
dures were "subject to the Commission's section 19 authority, an
arbitration agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections
153. Id. at 2339-41. The Court noted three concerns of Wilko: (1) that arbitration was
not suited for cases which required subjective findings; (2) that arbitrators were making
legal determinations without judicial instructions, without stating the reasons for their
decisions, and without having to establish a record; and (3) that courts had limited power
to review an arbitrator's interpretation of law or to vacate an award. Id. at 2340.
154. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, Byrd, Scherk, Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983». The Court placed particular emphasis on Mitsub
ishi Motors' endorsement of the arbitration process as a streamlined method for satisfac
torily resolving claims with only limited supervision by the courts. Id.
The Court also pointed out that Wilko had not been extended to securities disputes
between member firms, nor to post-dispute arbitration agreements. The Court stated that
this was further support for its decision to allow arbitration based on pre-dispute agree
ments, since the underlying assumption must be that arbitration can effectively handle
such matters. Id. at 2340-41.
155. In considering the additional power given to the SEC, the Court pointed specifi
cally to section 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1982), which prohibits rule changes unless
the SEC finds that they are consistent with the requirements of the Act, and to section
19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982), which gives the SEC broad powers to "abrogate, add to,
and delete from" any such rule if it would further the objectives of the Act. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. at 2341.
The Court rejected the language of the Conference Report as support for the application
of Wilko to the Exchange Act, because the legislative history relating to the amendments
did not address this subject. The Court also stated that it was unclear from the language
of the Conference Report whether the reference was only to Wilko or its application to the
Exchange Act, and exactly what the committee members thought "existing law" provided.
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14 for the reference
to Wilko in the legislative history of the amendments.
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of the Act."UG Thus, the Court concluded that SEC supervision of
arbitration procedures ensured an acceptable forum for the reso
lution of claims under the Exchange Act. 1117
The difficulty with the Court's opinion in McMahon is that
having decided that the key question was the adequacy of arbitra
tion procedures, it then assumed that they were adequate, or at
least that SEC regulation would insure their adequacy. In many
ways this is the same approach that led the Court to the opposite
conclusion in Wilko.u8 Indeed, in McMahon, Justice Blackmun
criticized the majority for accepting the adequacy of arbitration
for securities disputes without a careful analysis to determine the
accuracy of that assumption. 1119
In light of the McMahon decision, the arbitration process
should be examined to determine whether it is adequate to deal
with Rule 10b-5 claims. To the extent that problems are found, it
is necessary to determine whether they can be solved by revisions
of the procedures for arbitration under the supervision of the
SEC and the various self-regulatory organizations ("SRO's"). Fi
nally, if it is found that arbitration is adequate, it will be neces
sary to consider whether the Court should reexamine Wilko and
apply a single standard to the question of arbitrability of section
12(2) and Rule 10b-5 claims.
156. McMahon, 107

s.

Ct. at 2341.
157. The Court's language suggests that it might not validate an arbitration agreement
which purports to set up the arbitration under the procedures of an organization not sub
ject to SEC regulation, such as the American Arbitration Association. See Brief for SEC as
Amicus Curiae at 20. But see infra note 211, which refers to an SEC staff letter suggesting
that groups such as the American Arbitration Association might be used for securities
arbitrations.
158. In Wilko, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority for its failure to consider the
adequacy of the arbitration procedures. He stated:
There is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take
judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system as practiced in the City of
New York, and as enforceable under the supervisory authority of the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, would not afford the plaintiff the
rights to which he is entitled.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See supra note 51.
159. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2349-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Blackmun dissented from the majority's view that Rule 1Ob-5 claims are
arbitrable, but agreed that the RICO claim should be sent to arbitration. Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined this opinion. Justice Stevens wrote separately, dissenting from the
portion of the majority's opinion that held Wilko inapplicable to the Exchange Act. [d. at
2359-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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THE ARBITRATION PROCESS

A. Adequacy of Arbitration
The Supreme Court, having defined the issue of the arbi
trability of Rule 10b-5 claims as primarily a question of whether
arbitration can effectively deal with these claims, has left several
issues unresolved. What the Court has done is to place the pri
mary responsibility on the SEC and the sponsoring SRO's to take
action that will encourage public investor support while retaining
the benefits of arbitration. In order to meet this responsibility
and to evaluate the adequacy of the arbitration system for han
dling Rule lOb-5 claims, it is necessary to consider the reasons for
opposition.1 60 The primary arguments against arbitration of these
types of claims are: (1) arbitrators are not well suited to deciding
complex legal questions;161 (2) the absence of discovery places in
vestors at a significant disadvantage in trying to establish a
claim;162 (3) the informality of the arbitration process makes it
difficult for courts to control the decision-making process;163 and
(4) arbitration involves industry people deciding cases in place of
the courts, which have been charged with the duty of enforcing
the statutes regulating the securities industry in order to protect
investors.164
The belief that arbitration is incapable of handling complex le
gal issues is grounded in the very nature of the system: in arbitra
tion, the parties agree to give up the security that a court judg
ment is more likely to be "correct," in return for the savings in
time and money that the arbitration process provides. 161i If the
issue to be decided is whether a shipment of goods was defective,
the parties may feel that an arbitrator is fully capable of resolving
that question, and that even if it is decided incorrectly, both par
ties have been better served by a speedy and,low cost determina
tion. It is argued that the risk of a potentially incorrect decision
made by an arbitrator in a securities fraud case is simply too
great to be justified by the reduction in costs. That risk is consid
160. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
161. See supra note 18.
162. See supra note 19.
163. See supra note 20.
164. See supra note 21.
165. Mitsubishi Motors Inc. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 657 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ered especially great in securities fraud cases for two reasons.
First, there is a national interest in enforcement of the securities
laws which must be carefully guarded by having courts decide
this type of case. ISS Second, the issues are too important to the
individual investor, who may have lost his or her life savings in
the transaction, and will now have to rely on the industry, rather
than a judge, to protect those interests. ls7
This argument, that the risk in securities law cases is too great,
assumes that arbitration forces us to pay a heavy price in return
for cost and time savings-to wit, inferior decision-making. It has
become increasingly evident, however, that the arbitration system
which has developed in the securities industry provides a forum
for arbitrators to carefully analyze and decide complex cases. In
McMahon, the Supreme Court rejected the view that complexity
of the issues was a deterrent to arbitration and found support for
this in Mitsubishi Motors. ls8 In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court
characterized the nature of arbitration by stating that "adaptabil
ity and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. The an
ticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account
when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically
provide for the participation of experts either employed by the
parties or appointed by the tribunal."ls9 Moreover, it would be
incongruous for the Court to conclude that an arbitration based
on a pre-dispute agreement was incapable of dealing with the is
sues involved in a securities fraud case, in light of the fact that
courts have routinely permitted arbitration based on post-dispute
agreements, or when the parties to the agreement are members of
securities self-regulatory organizations. 17o Courts have increas
ingly accepted the proposition that the arbitral decision-making
process is reasoned and expert. l7l While there may be problems
166. See AJlegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910
(1977).
167. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2355 (1987) (Black
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. [d. at 2340 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633-34).
169. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633 (footnote omitted).
170. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340-41; Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633 (the Court's
comment was limited to post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims); Fletcher,
Prillatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71
MINN: L. REV. 393, 421-27 (1987).
171. Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). After pointing
out the Wilko concern that arbitration could not effectively resolve these claims, the
Brener court went on to say:
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with the system, the lack of reasoned and expert decision-making
is not one of them. This argument, therefore, should not prevent
us from taking advantage of the speed and economy provided by
arbitration.
The concern about tlme and cost has become even more fo
cused since the decision in Byrd, in which the Court rejected the
so-called "intertwining doctrine" by which lower federal courts
resolved state law claims along with the non-arbitrable federal
claims for reasons of economy.172 In so ruling, the Court opted for
enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate state claims, even
when to do so creates piecemeal litigation. 173 Thus, if state law
claims are involved (as they usually are), plaintiffs are placed in
the unenviable position of having to litigate their claims in two
separate forums, either simultaneously or seriatim. 174 Neither opArbitration procedures, however, have become increasingly sophisticated since
Wilko was decided, and the number of securities disputes being channeled into
arbitration has risen significantly.
A carefully developed structure has been established by the securities industry
for arbitrating disputes, and the arbitrators available to consider disputes are
generally knowledgeable individuals who have had experience working with the
federal securities laws.
Id. at 448 (footnote omitted) (citing Katsoris, supra note 18, at 283-87).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
173. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
174. The majority in Byrd did not address the question of whether, in sending the state
law claims to arbitration, a court should stay either proceeding or allow each to proceed at
its own pace. In rejecting the argument that claims should not be sent to arbitration be
cause they will be decided more quickly and thus have preclusive effect in the federal
proceeding, the Court did state:
Suffice it to say that in framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take
into account the federal interests warranting protection. As a result, there is no
reason to require that district courts decline to compel arbitration, or manipu
late the ordering of the resulting bifurcated proceedings, simply to avoid an in
fringement of federal interests.
Id. at 223. A full discussion of the preclusive effect of arbitration decisions is set out in
Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 623 (1988), in which the author states that lower courts have not followed Byrd's
view on preclusion, and arguing for the use of preclusion in appropriate circumstances. Id.
at 655, 669-73.
In his concurring opinion in Byrd, Justice White took the position that the two proceed
ings should go forward without reference to each other. He stated:
The Court's opinion makes clear that a district court should not stay arbitra
tion, or refuse to compel it at all, for fear of its preclusive effect. And I can
perceive few, if any, other possible reasons for staying the arbitration pending
the outcome of the lawsuit. Belated enforcement of the arbitration clause,
though a less substantial interference than a refusal to enforce it at all, nonethe
less significantly disappoints the expectations of the parties and frustrates the
clear purpose of their agreement. In addition, once it is decided that the two
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tion is beneficial to the plaintiff, usually an individual, who must
decide how to allocate resources in that situation. The plaintiff
will have to decide whether to accept the piecemeal litigation, or
whether to take other action to avoid it, such as agreeing to arbi
trate all of the claims, or voluntarily dismissing the state law
claims.l7II It is also an inefficient option for the federal courts
which must continue to hold or consider the federal claims while
another tribunal, the arbitrator, is considering the same transac
tion in another context. 176
The second argument against arbitration-lack of discovery
procedures-may present a more serious problem. 177 In order for
proceedings are to go forward independently, the concern for speedy resolution
suggests that neither should be delayed. While the impossibility of the lawyers
being in two places at once may require some accommodation in scheduling, it
seems to me that the heavy presumption should be that the arbitration and the
lawsuit will each proceed in its normal course. And while the matter remains to
be determined by the District Court, I see nothing in the record before us to
indicate that arbitration in the present case should be stayed.
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Notwithstanding this statement, some courts
have stayed federal proceeding pending resolution of the arbitration. See, e.g., NPS Com
munications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 760 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1985) (in an antitrust
suit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in staying the federal claims pending
the arbitration of contract claims); Brener v. Becker Pari bas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (staying the federal proceeding on the grounds that the arbitration "may
well clarify and perhaps even simplify the issues that must be litigated"); Webb v. R.
Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (in a securities law case, the court
stayed the federal proceeding pending resolution of the securities arbitration since Byrd
only stated that a stay of arbitration proceedings is not necessary). Other courts have
questioned or rejected any stay of these proceedings. See, e.g., Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219,
222-23 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that at least where Securities Act claims are before the
court, the cases should proceed simultaneously unless there are "compelling reasons" to
stay the proceedings); Shihadeh v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 461 (11th Cir.
1985) (remanding the case to the district court to decide if it was correct in staying the
federal proceedings in light of Justice White's opinion); Dimenstien v. Whiteman, 759 F.2d
1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that since there is no preclusive effect, there is
no point in ordering the time of the cases). Presumably, a district court which stays the
proceedings is hoping that the matter will be resolved in whole or in part in arbitration,
and that the federal proceedings will therefore benefit from the delay, while those oppos
ing a stay feel a plaintiff is entitled to resolution of federal rights without delay.
175. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 99 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (suggesting that if plaintiffs withdrew their
pendent state law claims there would be no claims available for arbitration and bifurcated
proceedings would be unnecessary).
176. The Court in Byrd made no attempt to defend the efficiency of the bifurcated
process which it set up, but simply stated that it was obliged to do so in light of the
congressional policies evidenced in the Arbitration Act. 470 U;S. at 220-21.
177. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 n.18 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Katsoris, supra note 19, at 287 n.52). Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alter
native, supra note 16, at 80; SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.01[1].
;
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a plaintiff-investor to recover under a Rule 10b-5 claim, it may be
necessary to have access to internal documents of the defendants,
to have questions answered, or to depose witnesses prior to the
time of the arbitration. Normally, this type of discovery is not
permitted in the arbitration process because it would mire the
case in complicated preliminary matters that would effectively
dissipate the speed and economy which are the hallmarks of arbi
tration decision-making. 178 Moreover, the presence of a formal
discovery system may have a coercive effect on the attorneys in
volved and cause them to use the system to its full extent,
whether or not it is necessary. To avoid this, and the expense and
delay that would inevitably result, it would be better to use tech
niques currently available to insure informational equality with
out an elaborate discovery system. For example, under the Uni-"
form Code of Arbitration,179 the parties are directed to "cooperate
in the voluntary exchange of such documents and information as
will serve to expedite the arbitration."18o Moreover, the arbitrator
178. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 287 n.52; cf. SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.05[9]. While
courts normally deny requests for discovery concerning a matter to be arbitrated, they will
allow it in exceptional circumstances where it will aid the arbitration. Koch Fuel Intern.,
Inc. v. M/V South Star, 118 F.R.D. 318, 320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing"deposition of
only witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the events who were about to leave the coun
try and would be unavailable for arbitration); Willen ken, The Often Overlooked Use of
Discovery in Aid of Arbitration and the Spread of the New York Rule to Federal Com
mon Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 173, 181-82 (1979) (setting out the facts that have been cited by
courts as a basis for allowing discovery).
179. Uniform Code of Arbitration (as"amended), reprinted in Fifth Report of the Secur
ities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Apr. 1986) (Exhibit C) [hereinafter Uniform
Code of Arbitration]. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration [SICA) developed
a Uniform Code of Arbitration which was adopted by participating SRO's in 1979 and
1980. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 154-56, the Supreme Court
in McMahon emphasized that the 1975 Amendments to section 19 of the Exchange Act
gave the SEC power to regulate the arbitration procedures of SRO's, which it has exer
cised by the approval of the Uniform Code of Arbitration. Participating SRO's include:
American Stock Exchange, Inc.; Boston Stock Exchange, Inc.; Chicago Board of Options
Exchange, Inc.; Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Inc.; Midwest Stock Exchange Inc.; Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; New York
Stock Exchange, Inc.; Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc.; and Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.
See Fifth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Apr. 1986) [herein
after Fifth Report]. These SRO's utilize the Uniform Code of Arbitration which they have
adopted. SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.05[1].
180. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 20(b). The New York Stock Ex
change has taken this one step further, and mandated that the documents intended to be
used at a hearing must be exchanged at least ten days before the hearing. Arbitrators
"may" exclude from the hearing documents not so presented. N.Y.S.E. Arbitration Rule
638, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 11 2638 (1988).
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has the power "to direct the appearance of any person employed
or associated with any member ... and/or the production of any
records in the possession or control of such persons, members or
member organization."lsl In addition to these rules, arbitrators
have the discretionary power to adjourn any hearing. ls2 This rule
would permit an adjournment if one of the parties is placed at a
significant informational disadvantage that might require further
time for preparation. ls3 Properly used, these mechanisms can in
sure a full opportunity for each side to present its position with
out resort to the development of an elaborate discovery process
which would provide more information, but which would also
cause the increased costs and delay that arbitration was intended
to avoid. I " Although it has been suggested that, in light of Mc
Mahon, the SEC and the SRO's should revise arbitration proce
dures to increase discovery/sli the more appropriate response is to
take no action until it can be determined whether the current
procedures may be used effectively to meet the concerns of plain
tiff-investors while maintaining the cost efficiency of arbitration.
If arbitrators, the SRO's, and the SEC are sensitive to the
problems which may arise in this area, an appropriate balance
may be struck without dramatically changing the arbitration pro
cedures or making them less efficient.
The third argument against arbitration-that the informality of
the proceedings makes it difficult to have judicial supervision of
181. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 21.
182. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 18. If the adjournment is granted,
the requesting party is to be charged a fee, not to exceed $100, but the arbitrators may
waive the fee. [d.
183. Thus, for example, if a document is not voluntarily produced the arbitrators may
subpoena a person to bring the document to the hearing, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982), and, since a
full review of the document has not been had before the hearing, matters relating to that
document may be pursued at a subsequent hearing. See SOMMER, supra note 9, §
118.05[9). While the power to subpoena is limited to hearings, the arbitrator may ask the
parties to agree to pre-hearing disclosure. Willen ken, supra note 179, at 182.
184. SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.01. At least one district court, in concluding that arbi
tration rights had not been waived, has suggested that because rules concerning discovery
in arbitration are flexible, they might result in the same type of discovery which had taken
place in federal court. Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442,452 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The abuse of discovery in the federal courts is well documented. E.g., Brazil, The
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposal for Change, 31 V AND. L.
REV. 1295, 1320-331 (1978); Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the
New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680,
696-98 (1983).
185. Burrough, Exchanges Mull Changing Rules for Arbitration, Wall St. J., July 24,
1987, at 19, col. 2; see infra note 211.
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the decision-making process-arises both because of the lack of a
record of the proceedings, and because an arbitrator's decision
does not necessarily include the reasons for that decision. 188
These absences can create a situation in which it is difficult or
impossible for a court to review the propriety of the arbitrator's
decision. 187 The Uniform Code of Arbitration does provide some
protection against these problems. For example, while no record
of the arbitration proceedings is ordinarily kept, any party may
request a verbatim record, and the requesting party or parties
must bear the expense of that transcript. 188 For an arbitration in
volving a significant sum of money or multiple hearings, the par
ties are likely to want such a record in any event. 189 While the
availability of this option may solve the problem, the SEC should
mandate that a written record of every arbitration proceeding
must be kept, the cost of which will be paid either by the losing
party or by the brokerage firm defending the· action, which has
the resources and an institutional interest in insuring an accept
able arbitration process.
A more fundamental problem is that, while the award must be
in writing,190 the arbitrator cannot be required to state the rea
sons for the award, and as a general rule is not encouraged to do
SO.191 In addition, there is limited judicial review of the arbitra
186. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) ("As [the arbitrators') award may be made
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,
the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of ... statutory requirements ... cannot
be examined."). Justice Blackmun emphasized this point in his dissent in McMahon when
he stated that records of proceedings are not invariably kept and that arbitrators are "not
bound by precedent" and are advised not to give reasons for their decisions. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. at 2354 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. The position of some advocates of arbitration is that a lack
of judicial review is fully appropriate since the parties have agreed to binding arbitration
and, to make the system work, the parties must live with "[a)n occasional mistake by an
arbitrator." R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED To KNOW 25 (3d ed.
1986). The McMahon Court was not willing to go so far, and cited Mitsubishi Motors as
reserving the question of whether claimants have the capacity to reinstate a federal court
action if an arbitrator fails "to take cognizance of the statutory cause of action." McMa
hon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 636-37 & n.19); see infra
note 194.
188. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 25.
189. See SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.05[13).
190. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 29(a).
191. Courts cannot require arbitrators to give the reasons for their awards. United Steel
Workers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir.
1981). The general practice of advising a,rbitrators not to give the reasons for their deci
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tion award. Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitrator's award can
be vacated if, among other reasons, "the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly execute them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made."192 While courts have read this language narrowly in order
to limit the review of arbitration awards,193 they have considered
whether there was a manifest disregard of the law, and whether
there was a rational basis for the decision. 194 This review, how
sions was pointed out by Justice Blackmun in McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2354 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRA
TION-WHAT You NEED To KNOW 29 (3d ed. 1986».
192. 9 U.S.C. § lO(d) (1982). Section 10 reads in full:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei
ther of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence perti
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
193. E.g., Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981); Na
tional Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Management Co., Ltd., 597 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1979).
194. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir.
1986) (citing Wilko as the source of the manifest disregard standard); Storer Broadcasting
Co. v. American Fed'n of Tel., 600 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1979) (rational basis required).
The exact meaning of the standard of review is somewhat unclear because of the gener
alities of the statements courts make in rendering their decisions. Professor David A. Lip
ton has suggested that there is uncertainty among arbitrators about whether "manifest
disregard" means that arbitrators must apply applicable legal standards, or whether they
can use their "commercial judgment, a sense of equity, and/or common sense as a basis for
resolving the dispute." Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions:
The SROs Must Decide, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 6 (1988). Professor Lipton suggests that this
has not been sufficiently addressed by the SRO's because the system was not set up to
deal with complex cases, and now that it is faced with such cases it must directly address
the issue. [d. at 5. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court's view is that arbitrators
are to apply the applicable legal standards in rendering their decisions, and that this is an
underlying basis for the Court's series of decisions which have moved away from Wilko's
distrust of arbitration. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-41. As the court has stated: "Finally,
we have indicated that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitration will not
follow the law; although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the stat
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ever, is of little benefit if the arbitrator has not provided the rea
sons for the decision. The purpose in not providing reasons for
the decision and in narrowly limiting judicial review is to stream
line the proceedings by reaching final results without a lengthy
appeals process. 1911 While such a purpose is certainly valid, it must
be balanced against legitimate concerns for investor protection
under the securities laws. In order to insure this protection, and
to provide a system which permits investors to have confidence in
the arbitrator's decision, it would be appropriate for the SEC to
exercise its supervisory power over the arbitration process to
strike a balance between the competing interests involved. It
should mandate that the arbitrators state the reasons for the de
cision so that the parties and a reviewing court will be able to
assess, in a manner consistent with the Arbitration Act, whether
there was a disregard of the law, and whether there was a rational
basis for the decision. 196 Such a change would permit an openness
that will encourage better decision-making and confidence in the
arbitral process. It should be recognized that as a result, there
will be some loss in efficiency since arbitrators will have to pre
pare a written explanation of the reasons for their decisions, and
the availability of such a written record will make it easier to
raise challenges on appeal. This loss in efficiency, however, is an
appropriate price to pay since the arbitration process is being
used to resolve claims establishing federally created protections
for the investing public.
The fourth argument against arbitration is that the system is
controlled by the securities industry, albeit under SEC supervi
ute." [d. at 2340; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Arbitrators may
not disregard the law. . . . On this we all agree.").
195. See National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Management Co., Ltd., 597 F.2d at
825.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 47 & 51. Courts have recognized the need
for arbitration awards to be explained in order to to insure adequate judicial review. E.g.,
Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 922·23 (D.D.C. 1987)
(vacating an award and remanding to the arbitration panel for an explanation of their
award, so that the court could "engage in meaningful judicial review of the plaintiffs
award").
One provision of a bill introduced in Congress to reform the securities arbitration sys
tem would require arbitrators to state briefly, in writing, the reasons for the decision, and
the elements of the award. H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); [July-Dec.) Sec. Reg.
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1054 (July 8, 1988).
In the analogous field of labor arbitration, written decisions stating the reasons for the
award are common, and there is strong support for this practice. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 281 (4th ed. 1985).
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sion, and that such control operates to the disadvantage of the
investor.197 The legitimacy of this concern is unclear. The securi
ties fraud claims involved are not cases that question the underly
ing financial structure of the industry; they usually consist of in
dividual cases claiming misconduct on a limited scale, such as an
individual investor whose life savings has been lost by alleged
misconduct. Arguably, the securities industry has a strong inter
est in rooting out this misconduct as part of its self-regulating
process. Moreover, the investors benefit by having knowledgeable
arbitrators resolve securities law claims because the arbitrator's
expertise in the securities area will allow for speedier and more
expert resolutions of these cases.
Notwithstanding this argument, it is true that investors, or at
least investors' attorneys, are concerned about the propriety of
the securities industry's control of the arbitration process. 198 The
basis for this concern is difficult to ascertain. It may be that arbi
trators with a connection to the industry may be perceived as less
sympathetic to investors than a judge who only sees these matters
occasionally, and so may be perceived as more "objective." There
may also be a concern that a connection to the industry may
cause arbitrators to have a "there but for the grace of God go I"
attitude towards the claims of investors. While these may be le
gitimate concerns, the limited statistical evidence available is at
best inconclusive as to whether the percentage of successful liti
gants and the size of the awards accurately reflects the amount of
harm incurred. 199 To the extent, however, that there exists a lack
of public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the pro
cess, difficulties will arise with respect to the effective use of arbi
197. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
198. As Justice Blackmun stated in his opinion in McMahon: "The uniform opposition
of investors to compelled arbitration and the overwhelming support of the securities in
dustry for the process suggest that there must be some truth to the investors' belief that
the securities industry has an advantage in a forum under its own control." [d. at 2355.
199. In its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in McMahon, the American Arbi
tration Association cited statistics on the fairness of arbitration. It stated that in the cases
surveyed the claimant was successful in 68% of the cases with an average award of
$26,000, and punitive damages were awarded in four cases. Brief for American Arbitration
Association as Amicus Curiae at 17. Of course such statistics are of limited value since
they do not tell us whether the parties thought the resolutions were fair and accurately
reflected what had happened in the cases. [d. at 2355-56 n.20 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Moreover, as long as arbitrators are free to decide cases with
out explaining their decisions, it will be difficult to assess this concern.
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tration in the resolution of securities fraud cases. 200
While some of this difficulty may be solved by a more open
process of decision-making,201 confidence in the system will ulti
mately depend on confidence in the impartiality of the decision
makers. In order to achieve this goal arbitrators must be viewed
as being independent of the industry. The Uniform Code of Arbi
tration has attempted to deal with this by requiring that a major
ity of an arbitration panel "not be from the securities indus
try."202 The individuals who will serve as arbitrators are selected
by the Director of Arbitration of the sponsoring organization. 203
The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration has set out
guidelines for the classification of persons as "public arbitrators."
Those guidelines state:
No one may serve as a public arbitrator who has been an em
ployee or partner of a member organization or subsidiary
thereof, or a shareholder of a non-publicly owned member or
ganization or subsidiary thereof for a period of three years im
mediately preceding his or her appointment as a public
arbitrator.
Additional information concerning a particular arbitrator may
be obtained by a party or the party's attorney upon request di
rected to the Director of Arbitration prior to the commencement
of the hearing or a submission to the arbitrator without a
hearing.204

In addition, each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge,
and an unlimited number of challenges for cause. 2011
While these provisions should help to encourage public confi
dence, they do not fully solve the problem. The definition of a
public arbitrator is broadly drawn, and may lead to some persons
being qualified as "public" who have significant ties to the securi
200. Kat3oris, supra note 19, at 310.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 185-95.
202. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 8(a). Claims for under $500,000 are
to be heard by panels of three to five arbitrators, and claims over $500,000 are to have
panels of five arbitrators, unless the parties agree in writing to have panels of three arbi
trators. In both cases a majority of the panel are not to be from the securities industry
unless otherwise requested by the public customer. Id. For claims under $5,000, there is a
voluntary option to use a simplified arbitration procedure with a single arbitrator who is
to be from the public, if possible, and otherwise from the securities industry. Fifth Report,
supra note 179, Exhibit D [Simplified Arbitration].
203. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 8(b).
204. Fifth Report, supra note 179, Exhibit B at 17.
205. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 10.
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ties industry. For example, in McMahon, Justice Blackmun
pointed out that this definition would permit attorneys for ex
change members or for SRO's to serve as public arbitrators,
which in his view is unsatisfactory.208 While due regard must be
given to insure that the panel considering the question has the
requisite expertise, the definition of public arbitrator should be
narrowed to encourage public confidence. 207 In addition, the Di
rector of Arbitration should be sensitive to any appearance of a
lack of impartiality in the persons selected for a pane1. 208 Beyond
this, however, the arbitration code should be amended to require
that detailed information as to the background of each arbitrator
must be provided as a matter of course prior to the arbitration. 209
A short waiting period should be created to enable the Director of
Arbitration of the sponsoring organization to resolve any ques
tions or challenges concerning the arbitrators.
In addition, SRO's should be required to prepare periodic re
ports on the selection process. These reports should be filed with
the SEC and made available to the public. 21o The disclosure of
this type of information will help develop the public confidence in
arbitration which is needed to establish the arbitration of securi
ties law claims as an appropriate method of dispute resolution.
The reports will also provide the SEC with a formal reporting
system to monitor the arbitration process in order to determine
whether it is operating fairly, and if it is not, what additional
steps should be taken to insure impartial decision-making. 211 If
206. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing to Panel of Arbitrators 1987-1988, 1987 Amer
ican Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) at 159-60, which indicated that 53 out of 70 "public"
arbitrators are lawyers).
207. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 311 (arguing that SICA's definition of a "public arbitra
tor" had taken these competing interests into consideration). The New York Stock Ex
change has revised its guidelines for public arbitrators to eliminate from the definition
professionals who represent the industry, or those who spent a substantial part of their
business careers in the industry. Also, close family ties with broker-dealers will be grounds
for a challenge for cause. [Jan.-June) Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.9, at 325 (Mar. 4,
1988).
208. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 311-12.
209. The New York Stock Exchange has begun providing biographical information on
arbitrators to assist with peremptory challenges. [Jan.-June) Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No.9, at 325 (Mar. 4, 1988).
210. These reports should include information concerning the background of "public"
arbitrators that are selected; challenges that have been made; the resolution of the chal
lenges; and other appropriate information.
211. The SEC is reviewing the arbitration process with the goal of revising the rules to
make arbitration more effective. The SEC's Division of Market Regulation has sent to
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adopted, these procedures will result in a formal, structured pro
cess which will give investors greater confidence in the system,
while encouraging a careful analysis in the selection process.
B.

The Wilko Rule

A second question left open by the McMahon decision, which
the Supreme Court has recently agreed to consider,212 is whether
the Wilko rule will continue to operate in the area of claims
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act. Although the majority
avoided this question since a section 12(2) claim was not before
the Court, the Court noted that "stare decisis concerns may
counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the
Securities Act."213 The Court's statement that stare decisis
"may" protect Wilko suggests a willingness to consider the ques
tion. Moreover, application of the Court's reasoning in McMahon
with respect to Rule 10b-5 claims should lead to the same conclu
sion with respect to section 12(2) claims. The basis for the Court's
analysis in McMahon was its interpretation that Wilko provides
only that the anti-waiver provision of the statute prohibits waiver
of a judicial forum where arbitration is an inadequate process for
protecting the statutory rights involved.214 Since the Court in Mc
Mahon concluded that arbitration was adequate to deal with Rule
10b-5 claims, it should also be adequate to deal with section 12(2)
claims. Arbitration, therefore, should not be prohibited by the
SICA a staff letter, approved by the Commission, which made a number of recommenda
tions for consideration by the member SRO's. Among the recommendations were: (1) es
tablishing a more restrictive definition of "public arbitrator"; (2) having SRO's publish
summary data concerning the results of arbitration; (3) developing the discovery process
more fully, especially in large cases, and allowing for depositions when witnesses are un
available; (4) having greater disclosure by arbitrators of their personal and professional
relationships, and making this available to the parties; (5) establishing an arbitrator edu
cation program; (6) considering special rules for large and complex cases, which might
include written opinions in some cases; (7) increasing the choice of arbitration forums in
agreements since most currently provide for New York Stock Exchange or National Asso
ciation of Securities Dealers sponsored arbitration; and (8) considering other sponsoring
groups, such as the American Arbitration Association, for handling these arbitrations.
These recommendations will now be considered by the SRO's which will work with the
SEC to consider all possible options before revisions to the process are made. [July-Dec.)
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1387-88 (Sept. 18, 1987).
212. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 57 U.S.L.W.
3343 (Nov. 15, 1988).
213. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
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anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act, unless there is some
significant difference between the two claims for purposes of arbi
tration. As previously discussed, these provisions are not distin
guishable for purposes of arbitration.2lI! The fact that the McMa
hon Court chose to ignore the "colorable argument" for
differentiating these types of claims further supports this
position. 216
Thus, in reexamining Wilko, the Court should conclude that
section 12(2) claims are subject to pre-dispute arbitration agree
ments. This result is necessary as a matter of consistency, and
because the reasoning of its recent decisions suggests that these
claims would be better handled by arbitration, provided that the
SEC appropriately regulates the process.217 In fact, Justice Black
mun's opinion in McMahon flatly stated that the Court's decision
"effectively overrules Wilko,"218 and since McMahon, courts have
divided on the question of the continued vitality of Wilko. The
courts which have concluded that claims under the Securities Act
are not arbitrable have relied on the argument that McMahon
chose not to overrule Wilko, and therefore it should continue to
apply.219 On the other hand, a number of courts have concluded
215. See supra text accompanying notes 120-41.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
217. In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed concern about the majority's overturning
such a long line of precedents denying arbitration. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2359 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Justice Black's dissent in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398
U.S. 235, 257-58 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)). The basis for concluding that Wilko should
be reconsidered, is that the underlying considerations which motivated that result are no
longer present, and therefore arbitration agreements relating to these claims should be
enforced.
218. [d. at 2346; see infra notes 219-20. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens was con
cerned that the long standing application of Wilko to the Exchange Act created a pre
sumption of interpretation that should be dealt with by the legislature and not the courts.
[d. at 2359-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to this conclusion by
merely stating that McMahon questioned, but did not overrule Wilko. Chang v. Lin, 824
F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1987); McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 741,
744 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (since Wilko had not been overruled, Securities Act claims would not
be sent to arbitration); Continental Servo Life & Health Ins. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 664
F. Supp. 997, 1001 (M.D. La. 1987) (while Wilko has been questioned, it has not been
overruled, so Securities Act claims would not be sent to arbitration); Johnson V. O'Brien,
420 N.W.2d 264, 267-68 (Minn. App. 1988) (a divided three-judge panel said that Wilko
had been questioned, but not overruled).
The same result was reached by a district court in Schultz V. Robinson-Humphrey/
American Express, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga. 1987), but with a more detailed analy
sis. That court also relied on the fact that McMahon had not overruled Wilko, but ac
knowledged that the Supreme Court may have wanted to avoid giving an advisory opinion.
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that the McMahon decision has "so undercut" the Wilko analysis
that it was proper to order a section 12(2) claim to arbitration. 220
In light of this movement away from Wilko, it is legitimate to
ask whether plaintiff-investors would be better served by arbi
trating their section 12(2) claims. It has already been pointed out
that a plaintiff will be placed at a disadvantage by having to pro
ceed in two forums, judicial and arbitral, if some claims remain in
[d. at 220. However, it gave weight to two other factors in distinguishing the cases. First, it

referred to the legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, see supra
text accompanying notes 110-14, and stated that the McMahon Court concluded that this
showed a clearer legislative intent to affirm Wilko's ruling as to section 12(2) claims, than
it did as to Rule 10b-5 claims. [d. While this may appear to be a legitimate position, its
weakness lies in the fact that the McMahon Court recognized that this legislative history
was unclear as to what Congress thought existing law was. See supra note 155. For exam
ple, since the Supreme Court concluded that Wilko only prohibited arbitration where arbi
tration was inadequate, then Congress's support for Wilko would only bring us back to the
question of the adequacy of arbitration. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54. Sec
ond, the Schultz court asserted that the Supreme Court had not specifically rejected the
"colorable argument" for differentiating between Securities and Exchange Act claims, and
so Wilko should be followed until it is specifically overruled. Schultz, 666 F. Supp. at 220.
The weaknesses in the "colorable argument" which make it unhelpful in analyzing this
problem have been discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 120-41. The same rea
soning used by the Schultz court was also used by.another district court in Ketchum v.
Almahurst Bloodstock IV, Nos. 86-2498, 86-2523, 86-2535 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 1988)
(WESTLAW, 1988 WL 42552).
220. In Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted sub nom. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 57
U.S.L.W. 3343 (Nov. 15, 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that
section 12(2) claims were arbitrable. In its view, McMahon had completely undermined
Wilko since it limited that case to situations where arbitration was inadequate to protect
substantive rights, and concluded that arbitration was adequate for Exchange Act claims.
[d. at 1298-99. In the Fifth Circuit's view, the similarities between the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act justified the conclusion that it should follow McMahon "which lead[s)
directly to the obsolescence of Wilko and the arbitrability of Securities Act § 12(2)
claims." [d. at 1299. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the legislative history
to the 1975 amendments meant that Congress intended that section 12(2) claims were
non-arbitrable. It found "implausible" the view that the two statutes were to be treated
differently, and instead thought McMahon viewed the legislative history as leaving the
Wilko issue to the courts. [d. & n.7. Similar reasoning has been used by a number of other
courts in deciding to permit arbitration of Securities Act claims. Ryan v. Liss, Tenner &
Goldberg Securities Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480 (D.N.J. 1988) (claim under section 17(a) of
the Securities Act sent to arbitration); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Aronson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 675 F.
Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Rocz v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 743 P.2d 971 (Ariz.
App. 1987) (section 17(a) claim ruled arbitrable).
In another case decided by the Fifth Circuit which gave the McMahon decision retroac
tive effect, the court, in dicta, commented on Wilko, stating: "McMahon undercuts every
aspect of Wilko v. Swan; a formal overruling of Wilko appears inevitable-or, perhaps,
superfluous." Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 n.3 (5th Cir.
1987) (citation omitted).
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federal court, while others are sent to arbitration. 221 In many
cases this will result in the plaintiff being burdened with addi
tional time and expense of simultaneously challenging a large cor
porate defendant on two different fronts, or having the federal
court proceedings delayed until the arbitration is resolved. When
the disadvantage of proceeding in two forums is coupled with the
reality that the arbitration is a quicker and less expensive method
of proceeding, little benefit accrues to plaintiffs' opposition to ar
bitration of their section 12(2) claims. This, of course, assumes
that adjustments are made to the arbitration process as have
been suggested earlier. The only factors that can be weighed in
favor of retaining section 12(2) claims in federal court is the po
tential "discovery" benefits in preparation of a case, and the hope
that a judicial forum will be more sympathetic to the investor's
claim. These benefits are hypothetical at best, and do not justify
a plaintiffs decision to litigate a section 12(2) claim, when arbi
tration is available, and will nonetheless be utilized to resolve the
other claims between the parties.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has shown an increasing willingness in re
cent years to rely on the arbitral process for the resolution of se
curities disputes, and has been more willing to enforce pre-dis
pute arbitration agreements under the Arbitration Act. In so
doing the Court has assumed that the process is more capable of
dealing with these matters than it once was, and that SEC super
vision of the rules of arbitration will insure the satisfactory use of
this system in dealing with claims under the Exchange Act. As a
result of these developments, it is important that the SEC care
fully review the legitimate concerns of the public investor, and
direct changes in the system that will increase public confidence.
Assuming that this is done, there are substantial reasons for the
Court to also enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements with re
gard to claims which arise under the Securities Act.

221. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.

